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With global mega sporting events attracting greater participation, there is 
increasing competition among nations to host them.  Hosting the two largest mega 
sporting events, the Olympics and the World Cup Finals, regularly draws the fiercest 
competition from many nations. Hosting global sporting events such as these increases 
national pride, supports infrastructural development, and potentially offers an economic 
boost. When selecting a host nation, the international sport governing bodies consider 
nations’ ability and commitment to successfully organize and prioritize the sporting 
event.  However, the honor of hosting does not come without concessions. Although the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) make a point of divorcing themselves from politics, both promote 
values of inclusion and respect for human rights through their charters and the associated 
requirements to host. The question this paper seeks to answer is whether hosting nations 
undergo any lasting political and civil liberalization as an incidental consequence of 
having to conform to the norms set forth by the sport-governing bodies. Detailed case 
studies of the Olympic Games in South Korea and China, and the World Cup Finals in 
Argentina and Mexico suggest that the values promoted by the two organizations can 
indeed have a liberalizing effect on illiberal host nations, but only if three factors are 
present and work in concert: substantial international pressure, focused media attention, 
and a high level of domestic activism/mobilization. South Korea experienced all three, 
and thus had the most significant liberalization in the years following its hosting of the 
Olympics. Similarly, media attention and international pressure contributed to 
Argentina’s liberalization. In Mexico and China, however, where only one factor was 





 With the ever-growing popularity of global sporting events, nations wishing to 
host them spend millions of dollars preparing a potential bid for the right to stage a 
glamorous and well-organized event. These events draw the attention and participation of 
almost every nation in the world. Hosting is an honor, and nations use these events as an 
opportunity to showcase their capabilities as a nation and their ability to organize a 
successful event. For emerging economies and global powers, it is like a debutant party 
with a geopolitical message that these nations are ready to be actors on the global stage.  
 The two most important of these events are the Olympics and the World Cup. 
They are governed by two global bodies, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and 
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). These organizations 
oversee every competition and enforce the rules by which nations must abide. In a 
manner similar to the U.S. constitution’s separation of church and state, these governing 
bodies publicly say that sports and politics are separate in the context of these events. 
However, these governing bodies actively promote a set of norms and values they believe 
to be at the heart of sports and good sportsmanship.  
 The question this paper will seek to answer is whether hosting nations undergo 
lasting political and civil liberalization as an incidental consequence of having to conform 
to the norms set forth by the sport-governing bodies. The norms these governing bodies 
promote are grounded in socially liberal policies and an apolitical message of tolerance 
and diversity, and they can have an impact on host nations that are illiberal or in 
transition. In addition, opening up a nation to the scrutiny of the world’s eyes gives 
otherwise unknown groups the opportunity to protest to an international audience on 
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governance issues, including human rights abuses, environmental concerns, gender 
imbalances, and government corruption. Once these issues are brought to light in the 
context of a hosting nation, many enact policy changes that they normally would not 
have. In this paper, I subsume these norms within a general norm of political tolerance 
and liberalization. I will consider whether host nations selected by the IOC and FIFA, in 
accepting these bodies’ conditionalities, ended up accepting political and civic changes 
prior to and after hosting. If the changes are still in place five years after, I will consider 
my hypothesis to have been supported. With a focus on emerging global powers, I hope 
to demonstrate a gradual increase in hosting nations’ adherence to political inclusion and 
civil liberties.  
This paper will look at specific cases where illiberal states have hosted a global 
sporting event and the subsequent political inclusion and development of civil liberties 
within that nation. The case studies will include Argentina, Mexico, South Korea, and 
China. The questions I will answer are: after being approved to host, (1) did these 
governments adopt any policy changes? If so (2) do these changes still persist five years 
later? If a government only adhered to the changes while hosting, they will not be 
considered changes with a lasting effect.  
With these events being inclusive by their nature, in the interest of unity, 
friendship, and non-discrimination, illiberal states will invite any one, from any nation, 
that qualifies. This fact, while no surprise to a host nation, shows the possibility of 
civility among hostile nations and peoples. After all, the event is about the athletes and 
the sports they play, not the nations they are from. This topic is significant to the field of 
international relations because these governing bodies promote norms in the name of 
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sports, and they can have great influence on host nations. Without accountability to 
anyone but their executive committees, these governing bodies are free to promote norms 
and values that fall under the auspices of their own charter. Thus, the IOC and FIFA are 
effectively changing state behavior by upholding and promoting norms that sports 
encourage, such as inclusion and liberalization.  
The influence of global sporting events is an understudied area within 
international relations. Since 1972, 20 of the 24 Summer and Winter Olympic Games 
were hosted by democratically liberal nations in the Global North. Only four events were 
hosted by an illiberal nation (USSR 1980, Yugoslavia 1984, Beijing 2008, and Russia 
2014). With respect to the World Cup, since 1972 only two events have been hosted in an 
illiberal nation (Argentina 1978 and Mexico 1986). Given that Russia will host the World 
Cup in 2018 and Qatar in 2022, the frequency of illiberal nations’ hosting these events is 
increasing. The resulting effects, if any, merit greater understanding and study in the field 
of international relations. With more illiberal nations hosting, nations spending more 
financially than ever before for event preparation, and the IOC and FIFA spreading 
democratic values through sport, any incidental liberalizing effects on host nations 




Research Design  
 The number of states attempting to host a global sporting event is increasing, and 
this thesis will analyze if illiberal states chosen to host go through an incidental 
liberalization of political and civil behaviors, which may have a lasting effect. With 
increasing competition to host these games, the amount of attention and recognition given 
to host nations has increased. This thesis will consider aspects of liberalization as 
promoted by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) organizations. To examine this question, I will assess any 
changes in political liberalization and civil rights in illiberal host nations from the time 
they were awarded the event to five years after the event.  
 One indicator I will use to demonstrate lasting political change is the Freedom 
House Index (FHI) scores for political rights and civil liberties. I will look at each 
country’s score for the year awarded the event, the year the event took place, and five 
years after the event. This data will show if hosting had any lasting effect overall on the 
country. Freedom House scores countries on a scale of 1-7, with 1 indicating “free” and 7 
indicating “not free.”  Scores in the range mid-range, 3 and 4, are termed “partially free.”  
The case studies will consider nations that were perceived globally as illiberal at 
the time they were awarded the event or at the time of hosting, including: Argentina 
1978, Mexico 1986, South Korea 1988, and China 2008. This sampling will cover two 
World Cup hosts and two Olympic hosts. I will begin by discussing the history of the 
organizations and the political norms espoused in their charters, followed by a discussion 
of how these events are influential in terms of soft power. I will also analyze the 
motivations for nations competing to host such events. I will then discuss the changes in 
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political inclusion and civil rights that took place in my specific cases as a result of 
hosting either the Olympics or World Cup, paying specific attention to whether changes 
were lasting. I will end by discussing the policy implications this phenomenon has on 
future nations competing to host, and how nations that will host in the future – 
specifically Russia (2018 World Cup) and Qatar (2022 World Cup) – are currently being 
persuaded to abide by these norms. 
Definitions 
 For the purposes of this paper, illiberal states will be defined not by the type of 
government or regime but by the government’s openness to political inclusion and 
civilian liberties. For examples, Fareed Zakaria, in his article The Rise of Illiberal 
Democracy, gives a good explanation of what liberalism is in the context of democracy. 
Zakaria writes that a liberal democracy is “a political system marked not only by free and 
fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of 
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”1  The key distinction between 
liberal and illiberal states is that the latter routinely suppress or ignore the liberties listed 
above. Those liberties are the cornerstone of a liberal nation.  Conversely, illiberalism is 
strategic behavior by a government to actively suppress personal freedoms of the 
individual or within civil society, namely the freedoms of speech, press, political 
opposition, and personal expression based on gender, race, religion, or sexual orientation. 
Therefore, this paper will look at illiberal nations that actively suppress personal 
freedoms at the time of hosting.   
                                                 
1
 Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November 1, 
1997): 22–43. p. 22. 
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Both the IOC and FIFA promote the liberal values of political inclusion and 
respect for civil liberties, with specific reference to human rights and humanitarian 
values. While their charters may not explicitly use the same terms in this paper, their 
charters describe certain related ideals and the role these ideals play in sport around the 
world. Political liberalization is often discussed as a corollary to equality and inclusion, 
and the ideals promoted by both organizations are in line with the rights of the individual 
that liberal societies support and recognize, which include political inclusion and civil 
rights.  
In the Olympic charter, the Fundamental Principles of Olympism articulates the 
same foundational elements of the ideals of political inclusion and civil rights. Principle 
1, which clearly advocates for the promotion and respect for universal fundamental 
ethical principles, is often viewed as the IOC’s democratic foundation and the principle 
through which it promotes and adheres to democratic values.
2
 Democratic values are well 
documented within Olympic text and literature, and are further discussed in the next 
chapter as one key element of the IOC’s overarching goals. Within the charter itself, 
these same ideals and democratic values are further explained in principles 2, 4, 5, and 6. 
1. Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a 
balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Blending 
sport with culture and education, Olympism seeks to create a 
way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of 
good example, social responsibility and respect for universal 
fundamental ethical principles.  
2. The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the 
harmonious development of humankind, with a view to 
promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of 
human dignity.  
4. The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must 
have the possibility of practicing sport, without discrimination of 
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any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual 
understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play. 
5. Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of 
society, sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall 
have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include 
freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining 
the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the 
right of elections free from any outside influence and the 
responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be 
applied.  
6. Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or person 
on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender, or otherwise is 




The ideals promoted in the Fundamental Principles of Olympism serve both to 
further sport and the democratic values that are inherent within the charter. These 
principles state explicitly the norms that the IOC promotes: the preservation of human 
dignity; sport as a human right; good governance; and the inclusion of all peoples. It is 
clear to see that the overarching promotion of political inclusion and civil rights, while 
not a specific goal of the IOC, are a corollary to the IOC’s values. Indeed, in 2014, 
formal accord was initiated between the IOC and the United Nations that furthers the 




 Similarly, the FIFA statutes state in articles 2, 3, and 4 similar provisions 
regarding political inclusion and civil rights. However, FIFA emphasizes an adherence to 
humanitarian values in the name of sport:  
Article 2. Objectives: (a) to promote the game of football 
constantly and promote it globally in the light of its unifying, 
educational, cultural and humanitarian values, particularly 
through youth and development programmes; 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. p. 11-12. 
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Article 3. Non-Discrimination and stance against racism: 
Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or 
group of people on account of ethnic origin, gender, language, 
religion, politics or any other reason is strictly prohibited and 
punishable by suspension or expulsion. 





Through its charter, as indicated in the articles above, FIFA promotes the notion 
of humanitarian values. Humanitarian values are attributed to the idea that “human life 
and dignity are essentially valuable and should be protected irrespective of gender, race, 
creed or political affiliation.”6 The importance placed on humanitarian values within the 
FIFA statutes correlates directly with the promotion of political inclusion and civil rights. 
Again, without explicitly referencing political liberalization or the associated values, both 
organizations’ core values advocate for equality among all peoples, which is promulgated 
throughout liberal societies.  
Based on the principles listed in both charters, the ideals of political inclusion and 
civil liberties are clearly laid out. Political inclusion is defined as the acceptance of all 
peoples and the participation of those peoples within a country, no matter their political, 
ideological, or ethnic origins. This notion also pertains to the acceptance of other political 
parties and the participation in politics by numerous individuals within the country. This 
means that any individual or any group has the opportunity to take part in the political 
system, whether that is by voting, forming a political party, or running for a political 
position: “Candidates for such inclusion are ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous 
peoples, women, the old, gays and lesbians, youth, the unemployed, the underclass, 
                                                 
5
 “FIFA Statutes - Official FIFA Document Downloads | fifa.com.” p. 5-6.  
6
 Joanna Macrae, “The Death of Humanitarianism?: An Anatomy of the Attack,” Disasters 22, 
no. 4 (December 1998): 309. p. 309. 
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recent immigrants, people exposed to environmental risks, and (if only by proxy) future 
generations.”7 
  In regards to defining respect for civil liberties, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides a clear definition for the purposes of this 
paper: “respect [for] individuals’ rights as members of civil society, such as rights to life, 
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights, and rights 
to due process.”8  
With these definitions, the promotion of political inclusion and civil liberties by 
both organizations can be seen in the articles and principles of both charters. Because all 
of these ideals are integral to the charters, the hosting of the events, which is a major 
undertaking for any country, inherently promotes these values. In addition, as these 
values are so closely linked to these organizations and these events, spectators expect to 
see these values in the host country.  
It is also important to note a few differences between the Olympics and World 
Cup in an effort to more thoroughly understand each organization’s potential impact. 
First, while each organization promotes the above norms, both categorize them within 
their charter using different wording. The IOC uses the idea of olympism to describe the 
values needed to uphold the truest form of sport, while FIFA describes the same values as 
legacies. This paper will use both terms, and each term will be in reference to its 
corresponding organization; however, both terms have essentially the same meaning.  
                                                 
7
 John S. Dryzek, “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization,” The American 
Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (September 1, 1996): 475–87. p. 475. 
8
 Robert W. Hoag, “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” in Encyclopedia of 
Global Justice (Springer, 2011), 544–45, http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-1-
4020-9160-5_533.pdf. p. 544. 
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Secondly, while both mega sporting events rotate hosting among countries and 
both take place every four years, an important distinction is that the Olympics are divided 
into two separate events that take place every four years (the Summer and Winter 
Olympics), which are offset by two years. Therefore, an Olympic event takes place every 
two years, compared to the World Cup, which is every four years. This is important 
because the notion of olympism is disseminated much more frequently than the legacies 
of the World Cup.  
Third, a country hosts the World Cup, while the Olympics are hosted by a city. 
The difference can be seen in the names of the events: Germany 2006 (World Cup); 
Beijing 2008 (Summer Olympics); South Africa 2010 (World Cup); Vancouver 2010 
(Winter Olympics). This also influences the financing of the event, specifically for the 
Olympics because the bid to host is presented by the municipal government with 
authorization from the federal government; as where, the World Cup involves only the 
federal government. Thus, the majority of funding for the Olympics comes from the 
municipal budget rather than from the federal budget. Cities are more invested and take 
on a larger cost with a smaller budget.  
Lastly, and this coincides with the third point above, the World Cup is hosted by a 
dozen or so cities and 10-12 venues, spreading the cost out more than with the Olympics, 
which is held in 4-5 venues and only one city. This is important to note because this 
means the olympism ideal that is promoted through the Olympics is disseminated and 
largely confined to one city; as where, the World Cup and the legacies promoted are 
disseminated in nearly a dozen cities. It is also important because the decision to host the 
World Cup, for example, is a federal government decision, meaning it may have been 
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rooted in a government’s foreign policy goals and objectives. That said, the Beijing 
Olympics, in China’s capital and in such a centralized state, was certainly agreed to by 
the highest levels of the federal government.  
Theoretical Review 
The theory underpinning sports for peace as a concept is a liberal one. This 
concept of sport for peace is so central to liberalism that is harkens back to idealism, 
which precedes liberalism. Idealism was a utopian concept about bringing international 
organizations together to foster peace. Later, liberalism was separated from idealism and 
became its own theoretical framework. The core elements of idealism are “the changing 
norms of sovereignty, human rights, and international justice, as well as the increased 
potency of religious ideas in politics.”9 It is based on the idea that values and morality 
should shape state decisions and interests. International institutions such as the IOC and 
FIFA cooperate with states in an effort to promote values and norms in the name of sport, 
which is central to idealism. Equally, for states, hosting sporting events and cooperating 
with international institutions both serve and even further their interests.
10
 As such, sport 
for peace is seen theoretically by both the state and institutions as an avenue of promoting 
their interests. Idealism, like liberalism, allows for a role for international organizations 
in global politics.
11
 Within idealism is the notion that human nature is perfectible, and 
these sporting events bring nations together in an effort to work together, foster positive 
relations, and create a more interdependent and peaceful world. In this section I will bring 
                                                 
9
 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 145 (December 11, 2004): 52–
62. p. 54. 
10




together a theoretical framework to explain why nations host by using the following 
liberal concepts: constructivism, functionalism, supranationalism, and soft power.  
Constructivism purports that global politics are socially constructed by the norms, 
beliefs, and behaviors within the international community.
12
 These norms, beliefs, and 
behaviors could be adopted by states themselves, or by institutions active in the 
international community. Jack Snyder explains the link between liberalism and 
constructivism and its core beliefs by observing how “international politics [are] shaped 
by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities.”13 These identities 
are an important aspect of constructivism and are often ethnic, social, or religious 
communities. The role of identity in constructivism “emphasizes how ideas and identities 
are created, how they evolve, and how they shape the way states understand and respond 
to their situation.”14 Identity promotion is also active on the state level between actors 
and institutions, and some theorists indicate that the two are of mutual constitution.
15
 
However, constructivists are not focused on the physical structures of institutions, but on 
the material structures in which they are given meaning by the social context of how they 
are interpreted.
16
 This means that, it is not the material itself, but how others interpret the 
material that really matters. For example, states are not concerned about nuclear 
weapons, but instead about the states that have them. The United States is not concerned 
about any of its allies having nuclear weapons, but about the possibility of other states, 
like Iran, obtaining them. Constructivism offers several important insights as to why 




 Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories.” p. 59. 
14
 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, no. 
110 (April 1, 1998): 29–46. p. 41. 
15
 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 




nations host. The idea that states are trying to conform and comply with certain norms 
shows a commitment to the values that these sport institutions are promoting. Equally, 
constructivists see these institutions as playing a major role in international politics by 
serving as a conduit for norm promotion among outlying or emerging states.  
Functionalism is another liberal concept associated with the promotion of certain 
norms and values. Functionalism focuses on regional integration and a bottom-up-
approach to integration through cooperation by states and non-state actors.
17
 This theory 
describes the world as interdependent, with states relying on interactions on a number of 
different levels functioning together for peace and prosperity. International relations 
scholars see functionalism as a “steady evolution towards a refined, completed approach 
to international organization.”18 Within functionalism, institutions and organizations 
formulate policy and become increasingly responsible for implementation. For example, 
with the creation of the United Nations came many agencies that focused on specific 
global issues, tackling them at a worldwide level rather than state-by-state. Agencies like 
the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) create standards for the 
treatment of refugees worldwide and ultimately implement these standards in many 
nations around the world. Epistemic communities are also an important aspect of 
functionalism. Epistemic, knowledge-based communities often focus on spreading norms 
based on a shared belief system within that community; therefore, it is easy to see that 
sports can be considered an epistemic community based on how good one is at sports.
19
 
                                                 
17
 Ray, Global Politics. 
18
 David Long, “International Functionalism and the Politics of Forgetting,” International 
Journal 48, no. 2 (April 1, 1993): 355–79. p. 356. 
19
 Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and 
the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” International Organization 46, no. 01 (1992): 
367–90. 
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The ideals within sport (i.e. teamwork, cooperation, decision-making, etc.) bring together 
a community that promotes policies that encourage sportsmanship and fair play. For 
states seeking to host a mega sporting event, functionalism and epistemic communities 
explain how cooperation between states and the sport governing bodies results in the 
promotion of values found in the charters for both the IOC and FIFA. Given the amount 
of cooperation needed to host, functionalists see hosting as a potentially positive step for 
the integration of international politics, norm development, and peace.  
Another concept relevant to this paper is supranationalism. Supranationalism, 
referring to an authority above the state level, is a concept closely linked with the idea of 
networks. These networks can create a unified community that brings nations together 
based on specific values: non-discrimination of nations, free transfer of regulations, 
permeability of borders, control over the otherwise uncontrollable outbreak of national 
interests, etc.
20
 The European Union is a good example of a unified community as 
described by supranationalists. Some organizations can be considered supranational, 
given their role in the international community. Another example is the United Nations, 
which is also an intergovernmental organization (IGO) given that each member is also 
the representative of a government. However, FIFA and the IOC do not operate as IGOs 
but as supranational organizations, operating above the states and telling them what to do 
in regards to sport policy, hosting, and participation. This is an important distinction 
because it means that those organizations are not responsible to any one nation; rather, 
they report only to the executive committee of the organization itself. These 
supranational sport-governing bodies operate above the level of the state, and as this 
                                                 
20
 Janusz Ruszkowski, “Supranationalism between the Nation-State and International 
Cooperation,” Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research 1, no. 1 (2009): 4–10. 
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paper hopes to demonstrate, incidentally influence host state behavior based on the values 
they promote. 
One of the most important aspects of the liberal framework is soft power. Soft 
power, or co-optive power, is defined as the ability to influence another into wanting 
what you want by ways other than traditional military or economic pressures, or hard 
power.
21
 This influencing is done through the soft power resources that each country has, 
including: cultural attraction, ideology, and institutions.
22
 Soft power has emerged as a 
new and important form of power in the 21
st
 century. While nations still have military 
and economic pressures at their disposal, soft power is now seen as a mechanism for 
coopting other states through diplomatic efforts and rewarding states that adjust 
accordingly. The soft power dynamic is complex and within international politics it is not 
utilized only by states. With the number of IGOs, IOs, and NGOs actively participating in 
international politics, both states and organizations use soft power to influence the 
behaviors of others. Joseph Nye asserts that states should use soft power more often, and 
sometimes in combination with hard power, in order to realize what he terms “smart 
power.”23  
One concrete example of soft power is how international sport organizations 
influence nations who want to host. The organizations’ list of requirements forces 
bidding nations to conform to certain expectations that the IOC and FIFA have. Jonathan 
Grix, a professor in the area of sport policy and politics, notes the importance of 
understanding the soft power dynamics of hosting and what nations hope to gain: 
                                                 
21









mega-events – especially the Olympics – is clearly considered by 
states to provide a major contribution in the process of 
improving  their  nation’s  image,  profiling,  and  showcasing 
themselves  globally  and  ‘attracting’  others  through  inbound 
tourism, increased trade and a growing sense of national pride 
through the often experienced, but under-researched ‘feel-good’ 




Hosting could have the effect of increasing a nation’s soft power if the event is a success; 
however, the resulting effect could also be negative if host nations invite the scrutiny of 
the world, yet fail to produce a positive reaction within the global community.    
 Within this theoretical framework, there are realist dimensions for nations in 
search of power and prestige. A fundamental assumption within realism is that power is 




asserts that, “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an 
objective category which is universally valid.”25 State interests – whether social, 
economic, or diplomatic – all fluctuate relative to a nation’s power and prestige within 
the international community. Realism offers several important notions as to why nation’s 
host. Through hosting such an international event, states increase their prestige around 
the world, showcase the perceived superiority of their state, and demonstrate their 
competitive nature to win. This competitive nature is documented thoroughly by sport 
historians, and an article by statistician Nigel Balmer indicates that host nations are three 
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 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Six Principles of Political Realism,” Classic Readings and 
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With regard to the norms that these organizations promote, it is important to 
understand exactly what global norms are. The literature on global norms has increased in 
recent decades, as certain normative expectations become more universally accepted. 
Global normative behavior has evolved and developed along with the expansion of 
globalization, with the most powerful states and institutions often playing the role of 
norm maker. The norms that become accepted internationally generally follow from the 
progressive development of human rights in western democratic nations. The behavior of 
states is often influenced by external normative expectations and may contradict internal 
interests; however, if the cost of non-compliance is greater than that of internal interests, 
states will often comply. Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, attempting to theorize 
norm-consistent behavior, found: “When interests clashed with global normative 
requirements, interests trumped norms and associated rules unless the punishment for 
non-compliance was both credible and deemed costly to significant domestic actors.”27 In 
regards to non-compliance with the norms that the IOC and FIFA promote, states wishing 
to host global sporting events attempt to merge internal interests with external normative 
requirements and see non-compliance as obstructing the possibility of winning the right 
to host. Therefore, compliance often and expectedly takes place. 
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Topic Literature Review 
There is some literature written specifically on sports and international politics. 
While it is not something most academics are focused on, there have been a few articles 
written on the subject and they will be reviewed here.  
Since the onset of the “modern” Olympics Games in 1896, sports and mega-
sporting events have been used to promote peace, cooperation, and nationalism among 
participating nations.
28
 Athletes compete under their national flag, embracing nationalism 
as much as possible. Even the IOC has taken up the idea, in the form of internationalism, 
by creating a flag, theme song, and anthem which all athletes recite during the opening 
ceremonies.
29
 The same holds true for FIFA, which was founded soon after in 1904. Both 
institutions have a long history of promoting peace through sports and holding sports 
above politics. However, in the last 110 years these institutions have evolved into 
supranational governing bodies that dictate the rules of the game, those who may 
participate, and what is expected for hosts of the event. The rules and expectations for 
hosting have also evolved. The course of this evolution has largely been in line with the 
institutions’ strategic missions and charters, fostering certain ideals the event should 
instill in athletes, coaches, spectators, and the organizing nation itself. 
The relationship between sport and politics, while under researched, is not a new 
discussion. Allen Guttman, a sports historian and one of the most well published authors 
on the subject, has written that the very origin of the modern Olympic Games in 1896 
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 Many other sport historians have also noted the connection, even though 
the IOC and FIFA fervently try to maintain a separation between the two. Richard Espy 
accounts, “Throughout modern Olympic history, officials have labored under the 
contradiction inherent in their ideal, forever protesting the intrusion of politics in the 
Games and sport. Given the organizational structure of the Games, however, politics is 
not really an intrusion but is very much a part of the Games and of sport itself.”31 
Historians have published the majority of works on the subject; however, a few 
international relations scholars have entered the discussion, mostly in the context of 
theories related to soft power and the geopolitical aspirations of hosting.  
Given that the majority of mega-sporting events have been hosted by western 
democratic nations, emerging nations see hosting as a geopolitical message 
demonstrating that they have taken their place on the global stage. By successfully 
hosting the Olympics or World Cup, emerging nations aspire to showcase the 
advancement of their culture, economy, and infrastructure. What better way than bringing 
the participating nations, delegates, athletes, heads of state, celebrities, the IOC executive 
board, international business leaders, and other political elites to one’s doorstep for a 
glamorous spectacle that highlights one’s achievements, organizing capabilities, and 
historical significance to the world? In addition, such events offer a strong likelihood that 
high-level individuals will see each other, offering the possibility to discuss other issues. 
As John MacAloon has pointed out, a mega-sporting event host showcases the 
capabilities of a nation and the macro-political forces that can result from such events. 
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“Nowhere else do such favorable conditions exist for otherwise difficult meetings – on an 
invisible, informal, and agenda-less basis – among such a total range of global political 
elites, including from nations at war or having no diplomatic relations with one another.” 
32
 Illiberal nations attempting to host are sending powerful political messages to the 
region and the globe that they are ready, or are reminding the international community, to 
be taken seriously.   
A few scholars have noted that these sporting events are increasingly going to 
new lands, namely emerging powers like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa) nations, a couple of which are considered illiberal.
33
 One only needs to 
observe the selection of host countries from 2008 and on, where each of the BRICS 
nations have been awarded either the Olympics, World Cup, or the Commonwealth 
Games (often referred to as a precursor for hosting larger, mega-sporting events): Beijing 
2008 Summer Olympics, South Africa 2010 World Cup, India 2010 Commonwealth 
Games, Russia Winter 2014 Olympics and 2018 World Cup, and Brazil 2014 World Cup 
and 2016 Summer Olympics. All of these hosts are rather new to the hosting scene, given 
that the vast majority of mega-sporting events have been hosted by western nations 
(approximately 27 of 39 mega-sporting events since 1972) and because all these events 
are taking place within a timespan of 10 years. Scarlett Cornelissen suggests, “[These] 
events are used to showcase economic achievements, to signal diplomatic stature or to 
project, in the absence of other forms of international influence, soft power.”34  
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Each of these nations could be seen as hosting for political reasons, striving to 
send a geopolitical message that they are ready to be taken more seriously on the global 
stage. Most notably, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) triad has recently begun to 
strengthen diplomatic, economic, and political ties to give credence to their status as 
leaders of the Global South.
35
 Winning the bid to host important sporting events has 
contributed to this status. With so much pride, patriotism, and history associated with the 
Olympics and World Cup, it is not difficult to see why these events have garnered such 
sociocultural and political importance. Wars stop, conflicts halt, and the average person 
tends to go out of his or her way to view what could be a potentially historic moment for 
his or her nation. All this “point[s] to both the appeal and elusiveness of sport as a 




FIFA and the IOC continually try to quell connections between sport and politics 
with public statements, asserting there is a clear separation and the two should not be 
mixed. As previously noted, poor worker conditions as Qatar prepares for the 2022 
World Cup have been condemned. FIFA has attempted to not get involved. FIFA 
Secretary General Jerome Valcke recently stated, “FIFA is not a United Nations. FIFA is 
about sport.” 37 He continued by saying that FIFA has no place interfering in national 
policies. Despite its apolitical claims, FIFA has appointed an executive board member to 





Peripheral’ Polities and Spaces: A Research Agenda,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 7 (January 






facilitate all talks on the issue of labor rights with Qatar.
38
 For an organization claiming 
apolitical motivations, this appointment indicates a clear recognition that the organization 
must be involved in national policies. IOC President Thomas Bach, in regards to 
politicians getting involved in matters of sport, stated, “The Olympics should not be used 
as a stage for political dissent or for trying to score points in internal or external political 
contests.”39 Both of these statements serve as examples of how these sport-governing 
bodies continue to deny publicly the connection between sports and politics.  
Even though these organizations continue to reiterate a disconnect between sport 
and politics, there has been a growing initiative pressing these institutions to use their 
power and influence to be directly involved in the development of global norms among 
their member states. Many human rights and environmental organizations have called for 
greater accountability by FIFA and the IOC in influencing member states, most notably 
host nations, which should only be selected to host if they comply with global norms. It 
has been suggested that these institutions incorporate community forums during mega-
sporting events in which issues of global concern can be discussed, including human 
rights and environmental protection.
40
 Following the suppression of protests by human 
rights groups during the 2000 Sydney Olympics, some scholars have suggested, “Instead 
of suppressing these groups, Games organisers in [the] future should examine ways of 
giving them a legitimate voice as part of a broader-based commitment to the promotion 
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of human values.”41 If organizers commit to this, according to John Milton-Smith, the 
member states and participants could potentially identify the global human values that 
need to be asserted during these mega-sporting events, ultimately becoming the 
benchmark for future international relations.
42
 
The conditionality implied by the governing bodies not only influences domestic 
policies, but also foreign policies. Governments that are not recognized by the 
international community have a place in mega-sporting events. For example, the IOC 
essentially conferred political recognition on East Germany and Taiwan, and more 
recently on Kosovo.
43
 States hosting the games must also alter their visa and immigration 
policy to allow athletes from states that were previously barred from entering their 
borders for political reasons to enter for the duration of the sporting event. While some of 
these immigration policies are expediently retracted following the completion of the 
event, some countries may grow accustomed to certain policy changes. Specifically, 
changes in policy towards immigrant workers, economic liberalization (due to the 
commercialization of mega-sporting events), Internet and media freedoms, and human 
rights observances may change permanently.   
While hosting nations may have laws dictating policies on all of the above 
mentioned issues, if the sophistication of the law is not to IOC or FIFA standards, then it 
must be changed for the time period before the event and while the event is taking place. 
This begs the question, what is the motivation for inviting such discrepancy into a 
nation’s national and international policy? The answer is that while hosting, the world’s 
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eye will look upon that nation. While each nation may have a different type of 
government, the incorporation of FIFA and the IOC conditionality into domestic and 
foreign policies can facilitate the development of norms on certain issues. After four 
decades of failed Olympic hosting bids, China won the right in 2008. It was noted that in 
China, hosting the Olympics helped “with self-confidence recovering [sic] and growing 
prominence on the global stage, China’s leaders have shown an increasing willingness to 
abide by global rules.”44 
Along with the age of globalization comes more access to information and a 
growth in economic multilateralism that has coincided with the growth of mega-sporting 
events. This change has also resulted in the growth and influence of FIFA and the IOC. 




 Nations are lining up to host to show how globally dominant they have 
become. The political aspects of hosting are beginning to outweigh any other perceived 
benefit.  
New literature suggests that the IOC and FIFA have become policy-making 
institutions.
46
 Given the globalization and commercialization of the games, as well as the 
nationalism that goes along with hosting, the opinion and policies of FIFA and the IOC 
are placed in a high regard.
47
 Therefore, their opinions on the matters of human rights, 
                                                 
44
 Dali L. Yang, “China in 2001: Economic Liberalization and Its Political Discontents,” Asian 






International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 4, no. 3 (2012): 447–51. 
47
 J. Sugden and A. Tomlinson, FIFA and the Contest for World Football: Who Rules the 
People’s Game?, 1998. 
 25 
environmentalism, security, and sustainability are injected into the societies that win the 
opportunity to host. Another logical topic of inquiry in the sports and politics nexus is 
whether supranational sports governing bodies can help liberalize host nations simply 
through asking host countries to adopt certain conditions in accordance with their 
charters. 
 With the cost of hosting either the Olympics or World Cup rising steadily, why 
any nation would want to attempt to host such events in the first place? A common 
assumption about hosting a mega sporting event is that it will create an economic 
windfall for the host nation. With the influx of tourism, money from sponsorship rights, 
and increased attention to the host nation, governments hope that successfully hosting an 
event will boost the overall economy. However, many economists have noted that the 
perceived windfall is not achieved due to the required expenditures for hosting such a 
specific sporting event.
48
 A study by Anita Mehrotra shows that nations awarded the bid 
to host have invested much more than they have received from the event, and long-term 




For her study, Mehrotra collected financial data from every bidder and host of the 
Olympics from 1933 to 2010. Analyzing data from the World Bank, she studied the 
average normalized GDP per capita of the host vs. runner-up of all nations in IOC voting 
results. The results showed, “The long-run impact of hosting the Olympics is negative for 
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host countries' GDP per capita in comparison to runner-up countries.”50 With this data 
clearly indicating that the perceived economic growth effect is false, nations should not 
expect any economic benefit or growth as a result of hosting. In almost all cases, the 
monies spent on venues, security, infrastructure, accommodations, and other relevant 
expenditures are substantially higher than monies received, and substantially higher than 
originally budgeted. 
 On the political ledger, nations seek the opportunity to host to legitimize the 
government. Governments may think that if they can successfully host a global sporting 
event, the success will lend credibility to their regime. The legitimacy sought by 
governments could be for domestic or international purposes, and these influential and 
global organizations that confer the right to host could, as a result, further legitimize these 
states’ regimes. For example, the 1986 Olympics were awarded to Mexico, a nation that 
at the time was ruled by a one-party system, which wanted to legitimize its rule.
51
 




Games were a success, it would reinforce the notion to China’s government that 
communism is superior to capitalism. The idea that success in the Olympics translates 
into one state’s success over another goes back to the origin of the Ancient Olympics in 
776 BC. “The Games quickly developed into a political tool, used by one city-state to 
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assert dominance over another.”53 Just like in Ancient Greece, today’s international 
sporting events are an extension of the state and an attempt to assert dominance in the 
global political arena.  
A country’s ruling elite may also seek to legitimize the state by hosting. In 
general, local political and business elites form coalitions to bid for a mega-sporting 
event to raise a country’s/city’s status, as was the case with the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 
Once Beijing won the right to host, “Beijing began reinventing both its physical 
landscape and international image to legitimate its claims to global city status. As a 
symbol of China’s emergence as a world leader, Beijing promised the best Olympics 
ever.”54 Ruling elites often have control over many of the industries needed to construct 
and stage such events; therefore, the money that will be spent often goes into their 
pockets. Cronyism is a systematic problem in many illiberal states once they win a bid to 
host, and corruption is often rampant. 
Ruling elites see hosting as an investment in urban entrepreneurialism, often 
aligning the private and public sectors for projects. The investment needed to revitalize 
and rejuvenate a city or cities capable of hosting such events straddles the private sector, 
local government, and higher levels of government funding. For example, in Barcelona 
(1992 Summer Olympics) the Olympic planning coincided with the city government’s 
strategic plan for promoting economic development and urban infrastructure projects.
55
 
This has widely been noted as an example of the positive urbanization effects that 
strategic planning for the Olympics can have on a city.  
                                                 
53
 Mehrotra, “To Host or Not to Host?”     
54
 Anne Broudehoux, “Spectacular Beijing: The Conspicuous Construction of an Olympic 
Metropolis,” Journal of Urban Affairs 29, no. 4 (2007): 383–99. p. 384. 
55
 Tomlinson, “Whose Accolades?”     
 28 
In the following chapter I will first give some background on the IOC and FIFA 
and then present case studies to show the effect of hosting a mega-sporting event on the 
liberalization of political and civil rights in illiberal nations. The case studies will be 
discussed in chronological order: Argentina 1978 World Cup, Mexico 1986 World Cup, 




History of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) 
 
When American James Connelly won gold in the triple jump on April 6, 1896, he 
became the first Olympic champion in more than 1,500 years. The first celebration of the 
modern Olympic Games took place in Athens, Greece in 1896, and was attended by 14 
nations with 241 athletes competing in 43 events.1 This event was the brainchild of 
French aristocrat Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who is known as the father of the modern 
Olympics. The most recent Olympics – Sochi, Russia 2014 – demonstrates how the 
Olympic Movement has grown since 1896; in Russia 89 nations took part, with 2,850 
athletes competing in 15 sports totaling 98 events.2  
Coubertin established the International Olympic Committee in Paris on June 23, 
1894, at a meeting of delegates from a few European countries. Since then, the 
organization has continued to increase in size and influence. Originally, the regulations 
Coubertin drew up stated that the IOC president should be from the country that will host 
the next Olympics Games. Thus, Demetrius Vikelas from Greece was the first President 
of the IOC from 1894 to 1896. However, that rule changed quickly, and Coubertin was 
president from 1896 until 1925.3 Since Coubertin, there have been seven other IOC 
presidents, and currently the position is held by Thomas Bach, from Germany.  
Coubertin saw sport as an avenue to create a more educated, well-rounded citizen. 
Other sport enthusiasts and educators from around the globe, in particular Dr. William 











Penny Brookes and Thomas Arnold of Great Britain, influenced Coubertin by supporting 
the idea of creating an international sporting event. Coubertin had heard of two other 
Olympic movements in Great Britain and Greece but both athletic events were only open 
to nationals of their respective countries. Coupertin wanted an international sporting 
event. Dr. Brookes agreed with Coubertin, having already written to the Greek 
government in 1858 asking it to open its competition to non-Greeks, as the Greek event 
was more widely celebrated and popular than that of Dr. Brookes’ Wenlock Olympian 
Games in Great Britain. Dr. Brookes saw sports as essential to mental and physical 
fitness and personal betterment, and he saw that physical education was necessary for the 
working class, not just the privileged. However, the Greek government denied the request 
and would not agree to any international participation for another 36 years. Instead, 
inspired by Dr. Brookes, Coubertin went on to found the IOC in 1894. 
There is a debate among many historians as to who actually founded the IOC, 
with many accrediting Coubertin with the codification of the charter, and others arguing 
that the idea stemmed from Dr. Brookes’ studies and experience with the Wenlock 
Olympian Games. Either way, both men had a great influence on the way the 
organization came into being, and both stressed the importance of physical fitness. Both 
men saw sport as an opportunity for all citizens to better themselves and their country, 
and their efforts resulted in what has become one of the most unifying events in all of 
international relations, the Olympic Movement.  
For Coubertin, the reasons for the creation of the IOC were simple: bring nations 
together for friendly sport competitions in an effort to create a more peaceful world. He 
wrote extensively on the idea of sport as an international peace movement and developed 
 31 
the theory on the “importance of character building through sport.”4 He believed that if 
everyone could participate in sport, it would produce a moral elite rather than a social 
elite.5 Given the development of sport in the U.S. and British education system’s at the 
time, Coubertin saw an opportunity for France to join the movement and bring those of 
similar values together. Thus, when the French government asked him to create an 
international sport association, the end result was the IOC. Over time, the structure of the 
IOC has changed, but the ideals on which the IOC was created are still evident in its 
charter.  
The charter of the Olympic Movement lays out the three main constituents of the 
organization: the International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Sports 
Federations (IFs), and the National Olympic Committee’s (NOCs).6 Also, each 
Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG) for each Olympic event is a part 
of the Olympic Movement. Within the IOC itself there are the Congress, Executive 
Board, President, and multiple Commissions.7 The Congress is the supreme organ of the 
IOC, and it meets annually at what is called The Session. It has the powers to adopt or 
amend the Olympic Charter, elect members of the IOC and the President, elect the host 
city, expel NOCs or athletes, and resolve any other matters regarding the Olympic 
Movement.8 There are currently 106 members of the Olympic Congress, and each 
member serves on one or a multiple of the 25 Commissions. Some of the Commissions 
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include the following: Sport for All, Women and Sport, Ethics, Anti-Doping, Sports and 
Law, Marketing, and Finance.9 The members are volunteers who represent the IOC and 
the Olympic Movement; they are not necessarily the representatives of the NOCs. The 
structure of the maximum 115-member delegation is as follows: 70 individual members, 
15 active athletes, 15 representatives of the IFs, and 15 representatives of the NOCs.10 
Much scrutiny has been placed on the IOC and its members over the years, 
largely due to its perceived lack of transparency. Critics argue that such a powerful 
organization should have more oversight and be more transparent, especially in the areas 
of voting and finance. Many of the votes for President and host city are still done in 
secret, with only the winner being named and the number of votes cast. Given the length 
of time this organization has existed, many scandals have bruised its public image. 
However, no scandal has resulted in a reduction in participation or bids to host.  
The values envisaged by the founders of the modern Olympic Games and of the 
Olympic Movement, as mentioned earlier, were to bring nations together in a mutual 
understanding of sport to foster better relations between nations and bring about a more 
peaceful world. Throughout the history of this organization, this ideal has remained its 
goal; however, other values have also been adopted. The idea of olympism is interwoven 
throughout the Olympics and its charter, but it also now invokes what the charter terms 
“democratic values.” These values are common to States and persons that respect human 
rights, and are also at the core of sports: equality, tolerance, respect, humanity, honesty, 






fairness and liberty.11 Through this important aspect of the charter, one can see that the 
common values of sport promoted through olympism are also used to promote democracy 
through sport. 
History of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
 
 The Fédération Internationale de Football Association was created to formalize 
international soccer competition. With the Olympics growing in popularity and soccer 
being one of the most popular events, multiple soccer federations in Europe saw an 
opportunity to formally come together and create an umbrella organization to govern all 
matches and create uniformity among the participating nations. Thus in 1904, Dutchman 
Carl Hirschman formulated and proposed the idea to the secretary of the Dutch Football 
Association (FA). With its support, Hirschman then reached out to Robert Guérin of the 
Union des Sociétés Françaises de Sports Athlétiques in France.12 Guérin was ecstatic 
about the idea and pursued fervently the formation of an umbrella organization. He 
contacted the English FA to obtain its support for bringing the nations together under an 
umbrella organization. Since the English FA was the oldest association, Guérin sought its 
approval first, hoping to garner its president’s support for the proposal. While he was 
waiting for a response, other nations heard about the plan and began to express interest.  
With the 1904 Olympic Games fast approaching, Guérin wanted an answer from 
the English FA so that the announcement could be made during the Olympics, allowing 
maximum impact for the announcement and ideally building momentum. The English FA 
replied negatively, indicating it would not take part. Therefore, on May 21, 1904, 
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members of sport associations from France, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and Switzerland came together in Paris and formally started the Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association, or FIFA, and voted in Robert Guérin as its first president. Since 
this historic day, seven other men have reached the rank of president. The current 
president is Swiss man Joseph S. Blatter, who was elected in 1998.  
 FIFA was founded to “set and unify rules for international matches” by bringing 
together the best FAs in Europe under one authority.13 At this first meeting, the FIFA 
Statutes were agreed upon: the reciprocal and exclusive recognition of the national 
associations represented and attending; the prohibition of clubs and players from playing 
simultaneously for different national associations; recognition by the other associations of 
a player's suspension once it was announced by an association; and the conduct of 
matches according to the Laws of the Game of the Football Association Ltd.14 The 
original seven members (Germany, being the seventh, sent approval to Paris upon hearing 
of the May 1 1904 meeting) quickly expanded the following year with the inclusion of 
five more FAs, one of which was the British FA. FIFA expanded beyond Europe in 1910 
when South Africa became a member, with Argentina and Chile following soon after in 
1912. After the 1912 uniform rules were imposed, all FIFA members adopted the Laws 
of the Game developed by the British FA, which are still used to this day.  
After a FIFA member won gold in every Olympics from 1908-1928 (1916 was 
canceled due to WWI), and the IOC declared that the 1932 Olympics in the U.S. would 
not feature soccer due to its lack of popularity in the country, FIFA decided it would 
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stage its own soccer championship.15 The first World Cup took place in Uruguay in 1930, 
with 13 nations participating and the host country winning first place. Since then, 
participation grew quickly: 16 more nations joined in 1934; 24, in 1982; and 32, in 
1998.16  
At the first meeting of the FIFA Congress in May of 1904, the original FIFA 
Statutes were created, and they are largely still in place today. However, after 110 years 
the scope of FIFA has increased, as has its organizational size. According to the Statutes, 
FIFA is comprised of the following: the Congress (supreme and legislative body), 
Executive Committee (executive body), general secretariat (administrative body), and 
many standing and ad-hoc committees which advise and assist the Executive 
Committee.17  
The Congress is comprised of all FIFA members, from each of the member FAs, 
and it:  
• Decides whether to admit, suspend or expel a member. 
• Decides on the location of FIFA headquarters (in Zurich since 1932). 
• May award the title of honorary president, honorary vice-president or honorary 
member. 
• Is responsible for amending the Statutes, the Regulations Governing the 
Application of the Statutes and the Standing Orders of the Congress. 
• May remove a FIFA Executive Committee member from office. 
• Approves the balance sheet and income statement. 
• Approves the Activity Report. 
• Elects the president every four years.18  
 
Essentially, the Congress is soccer’s Parliament, and currently there are 209 members. 
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 The Executive Committee consists of 24 members: one President, eight Vice-
Presidents, and 15 members (appointed by the Confederations and Associations).19 The 
Executive Committee’s main functions are to oversee the different standing and ad-hoc 
committees within the organization, stipulate how FIFA is organized internally, and to 
appoint a Secretary General. The Executive Committee is also the body that elects the 
host nation for the World Cup. In recent years, Executive Committee members have been 
accused of accepting bribes in exchange for their vote for host nation selection. FIFA is 
still trying to move past the ensuing scandal, with many FAs calling for more 
transparency in the voting process.  
 The President’s responsibilities include the following: implementing the decisions 
passed by the Congress and the Executive Committee through the general secretariat; 
supervising the work of the general secretariat; and overseeing relations between FIFA 
and the Confederations, Members, political bodies and international organizations.20  
 Of note, FIFA is organized into Confederations, essentially regions of the world 
that are grouped together to form a collection of FAs. There are currently six 
Confederations, and each Confederation is only allowed a certain number of teams to 
qualify for the World Cup. The Confederations are the umbrella organizations of the 
national football associations on each continent: the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) 
in Asia; Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) in Africa; the Confederation of 
North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) in North 
and Central America and the Caribbean; Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol 
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(CONMEBOL) in South America; Union des Associations Européennes de Football 
(UEFA) in Europe; and the Oceania Football Confederation (OFC) in Oceania.21  
 One unique aspect of FIFA is that it recognizes the independent Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS).  The CAS attempts to resolve disputes between FIFA, 
members, Confederations, Leagues, clubs, players, and officials. The CAS works directly 
with the World Anti-Doping Agency to regulate and monitor performance-enhancing 
drugs within the sport of soccer. Given its independence from FIFA, the CAS also has the 
authority to audit FIFA practices and decisions. This is important because it essentially 
creates a watchdog for FIFA and its members.  
 Given soccer’s popularity around the world, FIFA has evolved into a global 
business. Many critics complain about the amount of money FIFA takes in from the 
World Cup, even as nations are expected to spend billions of dollars in preparations, only 
to see minor economic benefits from hosting. Also, the issue of transparency is regularly 
brought up. A bribery scandal concerning the selection of the 2022 host resulted in two 
Executive Committee members being suspended before the vote. Investigations have 
shown that Khalid Electrical and Mechanical Establishment, a firm owned by Qatari 
FIFA representative Mohamed Bin Hammam, paid $2 million in 2011 to Jamad Limited 
in Trinidad. Jack Warner, the former president of the CONCACAF Confederation, 
Executive Committee member, and FIFA Vice-President at the time, owns Jamad 
Limited.22 Mr. Warner was one of the deciding votes that selected Qatar as host of the 
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2022 World Cup. Days after Qatar was selected, Jamad Limited sent another $1.2 million 
invoice to Khalid Electrical and Mechanical Est. The full extent of the corrupt and 
fraudulent practices is still being investigated to this day.  
Originally, the founders of FIFA sought to universalize and standardize the rules 
of the game, and foster the development of the sport by incorporating more FAs 
throughout Europe and the world. The Federation’s goal was simply to unite the FAs for 
better international match coordination. However, over time soccer has become the most 
watched and played sport in the world. With soccer’s increase in popularity, the scope of 
FIFA’s mission has expanded, as it enshrined the values it believes are most important. 
The core values of FIFA today are, as described within its charter and many of its texts: 
authenticity, unity, performance, and integrity.23 Each of these values plays an important 
role in the work that FIFA engages in: 
Authenticity. We believe that football must remain a simple, 
beautiful game played by, enjoyed by and touching the lives of 
all people far and wide. 
Unity. We believe it is FIFA´s responsibility to foster unity 
within the football world and to use football to promote 
solidarity, regardless of gender, ethnic background, faith or 
culture. 
Performance. We believe that FIFA must strive to deliver 
football of the highest quality and as the best possible 
experience, be it as a player, as a spectacle, or as a major cultural 
and social enabler throughout the world. 
Integrity. We believe that, just as the game itself, FIFA must be a 




All of these values work in tandem with the three pillars of FIFA: develop the game; 
touch the world; and build a better future. These three pillars are what form the mission 
and values set forth by the organization, which focuses on the social responsibility that 
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comes with being the overarching leader and authoritative body of such a popular and 
influential sport. Further, FIFA views itself as having a larger role through the 
development of soccer: 
This responsibility does not end with organising the FIFA World 
Cup™ and the various other world cup competitions; it extends 
to safeguarding the Laws of the Game, developing the game 
around the world and to bringing hope to those less privileged. 






strengthening the work of dozens of initiatives around the globe to support local 
communities in the areas of peace-building, health, social integration, education and 
more.”26  
In line with these values, there has been a push for a governance reform process 
within FIFA, with some proposals being adopted by the Congress in 2011. The reform 
process is in relation to good governance, transparency and zero tolerance towards 
wrongdoing on and also off the pitch.27  
In summary, FIFA has demonstrated a shift from its original objective of strictly 
match organization and uniformity to broader, more idealistic goals. FIFA’s new goals 
utilize the global popularity of soccer to focus on the advancement of the sport and the 
development of the individual, and to promote the values aforementioned. Through this, 
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FIFA hopes to “give meaning and direction to each and every activity that FIFA is 
involved in - football being an integrated part of our society.”28  
 





Argentina: 1978 World Cup  
In 1966 when FIFA awarded Argentina the right to host the 1978 World Cup, 
little did it realize this event would come to be known as one of the most controversial 
World Cups in history. As a result of a military coup in 1976, a junta came to power and 
consolidated its rule by suppressing dissent. Among other things, the regime kidnapped, 
tortured, and often killed opponents, mostly political leftists and intellectuals. In total it is 
estimated that around 8,500 people disappeared between 1976-1980, (hence the name for 
them, los desaparecidos) but many believe that number is much greater, upwards of 
20,000.1 Many states and organizations publicly condemned the junta in an effort to raise 
awareness of the situation. There was even an attempt by the Dutch to have all fifteen 
qualifying nations boycott the 1978 World Cup for fear of violence during the matches, 
and as a political expression of solidarity with the Argentine people. 
In addition to the political opposition, the Montonero guerilla group was a 
subversive group that had been in existence since before the junta came into power. It 
began in the early 1966 as a Peronist and Marxist movement against the authoritarian 
regime of General Juan Peron, who came to power a second time in 1974. Peronism, 
referring to the first presidency of Juan Peron (1946-1955) and his wife Eva “Evita” 
Peron, called for social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty.2 
However, starting in 1970 the Montonero group began using kidnapping and violence in 
an effort to meet the movement’s political goals, which were “the creation of a nationalist 
and socialist Argentina, a just and equitable distribution of the nation's wealth… and 
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control of the labor union machinery by younger elements, and the elimination of foreign 
economic interests from the nation.”3 The Montonero group existed until 1981, although 
a military offensive in 1977 by the junta effectively ended the group.4 Qualifying World 
Cup teams were worried about the Montonero group because of its often-violent forms of 
protest and use of guerrilla tactics to further its political agenda. Rodolfo Galimberti, 
leader of the Montonero guerilla group at the time, assured nations there would be no 
violence during the games, and all nations agreed to attend.5  
The military junta of Argentina ruled from 1976-1983; however, the military was 
also active behind the scenes in the years preceding the take over, that is, during 
President Juan Peron’s time in office. Historians note that eventually, “The military felt 
forced to intervene, however, and instead of peace and order, they brought terror, 
political and economic instability, and led the country almost to its destruction.”6 This 
time in Argentina’s history is characterized by high economic inflation, the rise of 
guerrilla movements, and the killing of opponents. Much of the mystery surrounding los 
desaparecidos still exists to this day. Many historians, and scholars in other fields, have 
written about the abuses during this time and documented the atrocities in depth.  
This World Cup was also controversial because the host country of Argentina 
won the World Cup under suspicious circumstances, which are still being debated to this 
day. It is suspected that the junta influenced, and in some cases even fixed, specific 
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matches so that Argentina would make it to the final, most significantly the match against 
Peru. Many of the Argentine players still feel they were used politically to legitimize the 
junta and its practices.7 
The World Cup was awarded to Argentina in 1966, weeks after a military coup 
had occurred. The military was in power until Juan Peron was freely elected in 1974.  
The election of Argentina to host by the FIFA Congress was easy, as there was no 
other nation bidding. Many nations urged FIFA to reconsider its host election at a 
meeting in 1975; however, FIFA president Joao Havelange struck down any thought of a 
change of venue. FIFA delegates stated, “It is obvious Havelange wants the World Cup in 
South America in 1978 despite the lack of finance and stadia and the political instability 
in Argentina.”8  
 When the junta took control in 1976, preparations for the World Cup became a 
priority. Juan Peron’s administration had given too little money and time to the project 
for any real progress to be made. The right-wing, repressive junta therefore enacted many 
policies to fulfill its desire of hosting a superb and peaceful World Cup, veiling any 
negativity or dissidence. The military was eager to take advantage of the situation it 
inherited and use it as a force for legitimization and to repair a deteriorating international 
image. The junta, placing such political importance on this event, “invested in 
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One major innovation came in the form of the introduction of color television, a 
demand by FIFA in order to broadcast the matches to nearly a billion spectators around 
the world, mainly to U.S. and European viewers.10 Demands by FIFA were mostly for 
training centers, comfortable accommodations that were in close proximity to the 
stadiums, and television equipment able to record all practices and matches. The financial 
investment by the military authorities can be seen, as noted by Knudson, as an ultra-
liberal economic policy adopted by an ultra-conservative, statist-focused regime.11   
In the run up to the World Cup, the military junta also began to restrict the press 
to writing and reporting only on approved topics. Censorship was a method often used by 
the junta, and dissidence was not tolerated. The Argentine press, a once very active and 
critical voice of the people, often against previous authoritarian dictatorships, was 
shrouded under a veil of silence.12 In April of 1976, the government sent a memo to all 
newspapers in Argentina requiring news agencies to follow certain guidelines in order to 
stay in business: 
As from today, 22/4/76, it is forbidden to inform, comment or 
make reference to subjects related to subversive incidents, the 
appearance of bodies and the death of subversive elements 
and/or of members of the armed and security forces in these 
incidents, unless they are reported by a responsible official 
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Those who did not follow the above guidelines were subject to arrest, torture, and 
sometimes death. In all, 72 journalists disappeared, were jailed, or forced into exile, and 
around 400 fled the country.14  
When the international press corps began to arrive for the 1978 World Cup, 
limitations regarding what could be reported were also extended to them, which led the 
1978 World Cup to be nicknamed the “World Cup of the Press.” The National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ) even distributed leaflets to members of the British press traveling to the 
World Cup in an effort to educate and ready those who would be covering the event. 
They contained phrases in Spanish which the NUJ thought pertinent, including, “Please 
stop torturing me,” “My newspaper will pay you well if you let me go,” “How many 
journalists have you butchered this year?” and “Please deliver my body to my family.”15 
Thankfully, no international press corps members disappeared during the World Cup, 
even though one was detained for several hours after commenting negatively on the 
regime during the opening ceremonies. Some reporters even compared the junta’s 
political exploitation of the World Cup to Benito Mussolini’s actions in the 1934 World 
Cup and to Adolf Hitler’s during the 1936 Olympics Games.16  
 To highlight international disagreement about junta practices, movements were 
formed all across Europe by regular citizens to try to bring together a coalition of 
supporters to boycott the World Cup. Protests took place in France, West Germany, the 
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Netherlands, Spain, Israel, Denmark, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, the U.S., and 
to a lesser extent in Mexico.17 Raanan Rein notes that the protests were a “transnational 
solidarity movement which was successful in promoting a public debate in various 
countries on ties with [the] Argentine dictatorship, on issues of human rights and 
international relations, as well as on the use and abuse of sport for political purposes.”18 
While the Argentine people may have not benefited directly or immediately from these 
protests, the extra exposure of hosting the World Cup created an opportunity for people 
of many nations to stand behind an issue in solidarity and with one voice. These groups 
created a public space where discussions about what the junta was doing took place, 
which often would lead to members of the government being asked about the situation in 
Argentina. The protests in West Germany garnered so much strength that the Deutscher 
Fussball-Bund (DFB – German Football Association) voiced a more humanitarian 
attitude than the federal government, stating that if they saw any incidents of human 
rights violations during their time in Argentina, they intended to contact the German 
Embassy in an effort to try and help those afflicted.19  
Once word spread via these protests and public debates, two players of the Dutch 
national team even decided to not play in or attend the World Cup. One of them, Wim 
van Henegem, was the team captain, and both were among the best players that would be 
attending the tournament. The French coach, Michel Hidalgo, also sought to inquire 
about 11 individuals who had gone missing, including two French nuns.20  










In sum, the practices of the junta clearly violated the norms of political inclusion 
and respect for civil rights within Argentina. In leading up to the event, los desaparecidos 
increased from 359 cases in 1975 to 4,105 in 1976.21 The kidnap, torture, and killing of 
individuals from other political parties violated inclusion and civil rights, while press 
censorship indicated an extreme disrespect for civil rights such as freedom of speech and 
expression.  
Of note, the junta invited Amnesty International (AI) for an on-site visit in 1976, 
in an attempt to counteract international criticism of its human rights abuses. The report 
produced by AI a year later was a well-documented denunciation of the practices going 
on in Argentina at the time. “The AI report helped demonstrate that the disappearances 
were part of a concerted government policy by which the military and the police 
kidnapped perceived opponents, took them to secret detention centers where they 
tortured, interrogated, and killed them, and secretly disposed of the bodies.”22 This 
brought more unwanted international attention against the junta, mainly from the 
administration of President Jimmy Carter, and the governments of France, and Sweden. It 
documented direct and specific actions being taken by the government to pacify any 
dissonance and the overall atrocities taking place in the country. 
In the junta’s attempt to dispel what it called “a subversive anti-Argentine 
campaign” by international human rights organizations, it effectively created more 
enemies by attempting to placate organizations like AI by cooperating with certain 
organizations within the international human rights network while continuing its 
repressive practices at home. The report quite possibly may have increased the 
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international scrutiny against the government, while building the support for Argentine 
citizens that led to the junta’s removal from power in 1983: “The Argentine military 
government thus moved along the continuum from initial rejection of international 
human rights interventions to cosmetic cooperation with the human rights network, and 
eventually to concrete improvements in its human rights practices in response to 
international pressures.”23 According to Sikking, the junta eventually invited the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) for an on-site visit in in 1978. Once 
the junta realized the commission could not be co-opted or confused, cosmetic 
cooperation turned into actual cooperation. At a minimum, the barbaric practices by the 
junta significantly decreased by 1980 because of the attention created by the AI and 
IACHR reports, political prisoners began to be released, and some political participation 
was restored.24  
The international pressures that coincided with hosting the World Cup 
strengthened the concerns of many nations about the junta. The scrutiny of the press 
corps, the coalitions formed in Europe against participating – which led to football 
associations and players becoming involved – and the actions reported by AI during its 
visit, were all factors that placed the junta on a trajectory that led to its eventual decay. 
Essentially, it was the act of hosting the World Cup, not requirements by FIFA, that led 
to incidental change in Argentina. Also, the practice of los desaparecidos dramatically 
declined in the same year of the World Cup, down from 3,098 cases in 1977 to only 969 
in 1978.25 Without the task of acting as host to such an important event, the junta may 
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have been able to fly under the radar a little longer, since they had a diplomatic ally in the 
Soviet Union, which blocked any possible UN consideration of the Argentine human 
rights situation. However, concerned states were able to sidestep this blockage by 
creating the UN Working Group on Disappearances in 1980, which sought to draw 
attention to the practices of disappearances around the world, not just in Argentina. Also, 
the United States agreed to release bank funds and improve relations with Argentina as 
long as the IACHR were allowed to continue on-site visits.26 
The actions by protesters of the junta show an aspect of inclusion in a different 
way than what the World Cup normally attempts to create.  These groups, coming 
together around the world to protest the military junta, capture in essence what inclusion 
is, and how it can be used in relation to mega-sporting events. While inclusion within the 
country may not have taken place, inclusion around the world took place in support of the 
Argentine people and what was happening to them. This ultimately brought enough 
pressure from international sources to influence the junta to reduce human rights abuses. 
Over the course of the next five years, Argentina saw a dramatic change on the political 
and military level, ultimately leading to free elections in 1983. This change was not just 
attributable to the World Cup but also to the misguided Argentinian intervention in the 
Malvinas Islands: “At the political level, the suppression of all political activity and the 
banning of democratic rights was the unvarying rule until 1981, when a political dialogue 
began. Subsequently the defeat in the Malvinas (Falklands) war forced the government to 
hold elections and relinquish power.”27 
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As stated in my research design chapter, I will use Freedom House Index (FHI) 
scores to observe political changes in host countries. Observing the FHI scores in the case 
of Argentina, the scores clearly indicate that advancement and lasting change remained 
five years after hosting (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Freedom House Index scores for the year the event was awarded, the year hosted, and 











































































WC = World Cup 
SO = Summer Olympics 
* PR = Political Rights; CL = Civil Liberties 
** N/A = Scores were not available for the date the event was awarded, FHI scores began in 1972. 
Source: Freedom House Index http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U2bEAlyuJiA.  
The Freedom House Index scores range from 1-7: 1-3 is considered Free; 4-5 is considered Partially Free; and 6-7 is 
considered Not Free. 
 
The scores clearly indicate an increase in liberalization in the years following the 1978 
World Cup. Argentina’s Political Rights score went from a six in 1978 to a two five years 
later, and its Civil Liberties score improved from a five in 1978 to a two after years later. 
There was a dramatic change from a designation of not free, to a designation of free 
within five years. The events that took place in the late 1970s moved Argentina toward 
liberalization and democratization, and ultimately towards the introduction of democratic 
reforms by the junta. 
Mexico: 1986 World Cup 
Mexico was the first nation ever to host the World Cup twice, having hosted in 
1970 and again 16 years later in 1986. It also had the honor of hosting the 1968 Summer 
Olympics, which was one of the most politically charged sporting events in history. It 
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was in Mexico City in 1968 that black American athletes Tommie Smith and John Carlos 
raised their fists on the medal podium in a move of solidarity with African Americans 
involved in the civil rights movement in the U.S. and with the Olympic Project on 
Human Rights.28 Their black-gloved political salute resulted in the athletes’ removal and 
expulsion from the Olympics and the U.S. Olympics team as well as the retraction of 
their medals. 
 Modern Mexican political history begins in 1929 with the election of a civilian 
government controlled by a single political party, the Nationalist Revolution Party. The 
Nationalist Revolution Party was renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, 
in 1946.29 While it was an elected government, the regime was characterized by 
authoritarian policies and was led by individuals attempting to consolidate power. Most 
scholars classify the PRI-led government as a corporatist, centralized, one-party state that 
gave extreme amounts of power to the President.30 The PRI effectively controlled Mexico 
for 70 years, and during those 70 years, the ruling regime instituted many repressive 
policies to control the population.  
One of the notably repressive acts occurred in 1968, just days before the 
Olympics opening ceremony. The PRI-led government ordered army troops to open fire 
on students holding peaceful protests around the Tlaltelolco housing project in Mexico 
City. The government “officially admitted forty-three deaths, but knowledgeable 
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observers suggest that at least three hundred to five hundred people were killed, over two 
thousand were wounded, and fifteen hundred to two thousand people were taken 
prisoner.”31 The massacre garnered little international attention, with the IOC 
determining the Games should go forward as planned. Some scholars have asserted that 
neither the students nor the government made a connection between the massacre and the 
Olympics; the connection has only been made after the event.32  
 The Tlaltelolco Massacre was the most significant and defining event of the PRI’s 
lethal hand. However, in the 1970s and early 1980s, human rights abuses and a 
crackdown on political dissent continued on a smaller, quieter, and less public scale. The 
ruling regime used other illiberal acts to consolidate power: torture was routinely used to 
gather confessions from political prisoners; electoral fraud was rampant; and press 
censorship occurred often.33 It is also estimated that in the 1970s nearly 500 people 
disappeared, ostensibly as part of a government led counter-insurgency campaign.34 The 
regime effectively deceived the international community regarding its human rights 
abuses by being vocal advocates for human rights on the international level, often times 
having one of the most progressive voices at the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission. The international human rights networks at the time were also more 
focused on the atrocities taking place in other Latin American countries.  
 In the 1980s, Mexico experienced a surge of pro-democratic voices after the 1982 
debt crisis made many citizens wonder why they were supporting such a regime: “The 
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governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) struggled to maintain the unity of its 
authoritarian coalition as government revenues fell sharply.”35 This resulted in calls for 
political democracy by Mexican civil society and brought human rights abuses to the 
forefront of the agenda. In 1984 a group of intellectuals, activists, and politicians created 
the Mexican Academy for Human Rights, which sought to educate citizens and create a 
space for debates on human rights. This led to a proliferation of human rights based 
NGOs: “In 1984, only four human rights NGOs existed in Mexico, seven years later there 
were sixty, and by 1993 there were over two hundred independent human rights 
monitoring and advocacy NGOs.”36  
 The creation of the Mexican Academy for Human Rights facilitated international 
recognition of the abuses taking place. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
both published their first reports documenting cases of refugee abuses (HRW, 1984) and 
rural violence in Mexico (AI, 1986) after the expansion of domestic NGOs beginning in 
1984. While the reports did upset the Mexican government because of its image as a 
human rights defender, the reports did not lead to any substantial changes in government 
practices.37 However, during this time period the pro-democracy movement really began 
to gain popularity, largely due to the country’s financial issues: 
For Mexico’s diverse social movements, demands for social and 
economic rights dominated the 1970s, but the call for political 
democracy  filled  many  of  Mexico’s  principal  plazas  in  the 
1980s. The 1985 earthquakes were a watershed; an impressive 
citizen response contrasted sharply with the government’s initial 
incapacity. New social actors insisted on becoming legitimate 
players  under  new  rules  of  the  game.  The  state’s  lack  of 
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accountability to society had long met largely with apparent 
resignation, but by the late 1980s broad sectors of Mexican 
society from across the political spectrum – even including 
important sectors of the ruling party – agreed that Mexico had to 





to concede the right to host in 1982 due to FIFA’s new financial demands to expand the 
qualifying field from 16 to 24 teams, requiring additional facilities to host the Cup. In 
1983, the FIFA Executive Committee selected Mexico, over Canada and the U.S., by 
unanimous decision.39 The group of candidates was limited to only North and South 
American countries per the FIFA Statutes and the regional rotating method of host 
selection.  
It is in this context of economic upheaval and the increasing political 
discontentment that Mexico hosted the World Cup in 1986. The World Cup itself was a 
success, with Argentina defeating West Germany in a splendid final that saw Diego 
Maradona scoring two of the most famous goals ever in World Cup history: his infamous 
“Hand of God” goal; and four minutes later recording what has been voted the “Goal of 
the Century.” It is also where “the wave” was created. However, it seems that in this case 
FIFA turned a blind-eye to what it knew was going on in the country. In its final report 
on the 86’ World Cup, the Mexico Organizing Committee Chairman Guillermo Cañedo 
stated, “[Mexico] wanted to show what it was capable of in spite of the world's 
skepticism,” and the end result was better than expected.40 Mexico “gave the World Cup 
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the best possible setting, kept violence away from the stadia and transferred its 
enthusiasm and happiness about the accomplishments of its own team to football in 
general.”41  
Other FIFA officials gave similar perspectives regarding the lack of violence. 
Hermann Neuberger, President of the FIFA Organizing Committee, stated that “The 
World Cup's absence of violence in a problem-ridden Mexico … is but one of its many 
positive aspects.”42 Both of these statements come from the FIFA 1986 Official Report, 
meaning that there must have been serious concern about violence in Mexico before the 
event.  
The growth of domestic NGOs within Mexico from 1984 may be attributed to the 
international scrutiny brought on by the World Cup. Civil society in Mexico flourished in 
the years leading up to the World Cup, possibly because the government was too busy 
preparing for the event.  And, within a year of hosting the first faction of the PRI broke 
away. 
In Mexico, the overall severity of abuses was not on par with other examples cited 
in this thesis. However, the suppression of civil liberties and freedoms definitely occurred 
under PRI rule. It took an economic crisis to bring about the first wave of political 
backlash, which resulted in the first faction breaking away from the PRI in 1987 forming 
a new, pro-democracy, political party. This faction consisted of political and social elites 
that were tired of being subjected to the PRI’s domineering practices; they therefore 
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established the National Democratic Front (FDN) and successfully ran an oppositional 
campaign for President, Governor, and members of Parliament the following year.43  
The FDN lost the Presidential election to the PRI; however, there was massive 
election fraud: “The dimensions of the fraud revealed themselves in the days that 
followed [the election]: the press reported tens of thousands of pro-FDN ballots found 
burnt and discarded, tally sheets altered.”44 The perception of the elections as illegitimate 
led the President-elect to support the creation of a Permanent Agrarian Congress in 1989. 
This paved the pay for other political and social organizations to be created and actually 
be involved in politics, “For the first time, a PRI regime accepted non-PRI-affiliated 
organizations, including some associated with opposition parties, as valid interlocuters.”45 
It seems that hosting had a grassroots effect within Mexico. This in turn, eventually led to 
a larger movement that continues fighting for social and political freedoms to this day.  
Observing the FHI scores in the case of Mexico, the numbers indicate neutral 
growth within five years of hosting. Based on the Table 4.1, Mexico’s Political Rights 
score actually moved further away from being considered free. The initial score on the 
year it was awarded the right to host was three, with negative growth resulting in a four 
by the time the event took place. Similarly, there was no change in the Civil Liberties 
score. Mexico’s civil liberties score remained unchanged in 1983, the year it hosted, and 
five years later. Both scores indicate that Mexico was considered partially free by the 
FHI. While substantial growth in the areas above did not occur within Mexico overall, the 
proliferation of NGOs in Mexico during this time period has been well documented.  
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Overall, it seems that no lasting incidental liberalization took place in the areas of 
political inclusion and civil liberties due to hosting. However, several mitigating factors 
can be looked at in the case of the 1986 World Cup. First, Mexico was awarded the right 
to host only three years before the event was to take place. Many of the normal reforms 
that coincide with mega-sporting events did not happen. The shorter time frame meant 
that specific changes usually required by FIFA were hastily passed over, in an effort to 
ease the host country’s burden. Second, the PRI’s strong international human rights 
record did not suggest scrutiny. Therefore, nations assumed that Mexico’s strong human 
right rhetoric at the United Nations did not call for international evaluations of its internal 
human rights policies. These mitigating factors decreased the likely-hood that substantial 
change could take place in Mexico as a result of hosting.  
South Korea: 1988 Summer Olympics  
The 1988 Summer Olympics that took place in Seoul, South Korea were regarded 
as one of the most successful mega-sporting events in Olympic history at the time: a 
record-breaking 14,000 athletes and officials from 160 countries participated.46 When 
Seoul won the right to host in 1981, narrowly beating out rival and former colonial ruler 
Japan, many commentators expressed concern about the political climate in South Korea 
because of the oppressive nature of the ruling military regime and the continuing 
deteriorating North-South relations since the Korean War ended in 1953.47 However, the 
political protests during the Olympic preparations led the military regime to enact 
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sweeping democratic reforms that resulted in a new, multiparty, electoral democracy.48 
Korea’s democratic reformation is one of the best examples of how hosting a mega-
sporting event can contribute to a political and normative change.  
The original architect of the South Korean bid to host was military General Park 
Chung-hee. A military coup in 1961 brought Park to power, and he immediately sought 
to suppress political dissonance and rivals by removing all other parties from 
participation in government. 49 Park also actively suppressed many social groups within 
South Korea at the time, including: scholars, students, various religious groups, workers, 
and journalists. His rule saw an increase in protests by all of these groups, and at times 
his regime used violence to subdue any dissonance. In 1971, to quell student protests 
against his third presidential term and newly-mandated military training for all, General 
Park issued a garrison decree that stationed military personal at all colleges in South 
Korea.50 He also attempted to control the press by enacting the 1963 Media Law, which 
“gave the government the authority to monitor and censor any media publications as well 
as televised and radio news.”51 A revision of the law in 1973 gave General Park ultimate 
power over the media.  
While many human rights abuses were taking place, Park also oversaw the 
greatest advancement of the Korean economy under his rule. Park instituted economic 
policies that saw the economy grow by an average of 9.7 percent per annum.52 Scholars 
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consider these policies to demonstrate economic liberalization at a time when the political 
situation was becoming increasingly illiberal. With the economic growth, a growing 
middle class became increasingly tired of the repressive regime, and more protests broke 
out across the country. These protests continued and grew more intense in the late 1970s, 
until Park’s assassination in 1979.  
At this time, General Chun Doo-hwan took power, continuing the military 
regime’s rule. In continuing Park’s policies, General Chun did not allow any dissonance, 
and ultimately declared martial law in 1980. This enraged students in the city of 
Kwangju, who began an uprising that changed the course of South Korean history: 
The contest between students and the state came to a head in the 
city of Kwangju on May 18, 1980 when students from Chonnam 
University clashed with the police. This confrontation quickly 
escalated into civil strive and several hundred civilians died in 
that incident. Following the Kwangju massacre, Chun Doo Hwan 
executed a strict policy of repressing any dissenting voices that 
would challenge his rise to power. Not only student protest, but 




Government documents state that around 500 protesters were killed, while human rights 
organizations estimate it could have been as many as 2,000.54  
 In 1981 Chun was indirectly elected to a seven-year term as president, ending 
martial law, and the government continued to strong-arm any dissent. “Politically, the 
country remained dominated by centralised, authoritarian and illiberal (though deeply 
anti-communist) governments. Under these governments, human rights abuses were 
widespread, corruption was rampant and suppression of opposition was almost certain.”55 
During Chun’s first few years in office, the democracy movement of the 1960s and 70s 
                                                 
53
 Shin et al., South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1993). p. 25. 
54
 Democracy Now, “25 Years Ago: The Kwangju Massacre in South Korea,” Democracy Now!, 
May 18, 2005, http://www.democracynow.org/2005/5/18/25_years_ago_the_kwangju_massacre. 
55
 Black and Bezanson, “The Olympic Games, Human Rights and Democratisation.” p. 1248. 
 60 
was largely nonexistent out of fear that those involved would be put into prison, tortured, 
or killed. 
According to Manheim, in 1981 when the IOC chose Seoul to host the 1988 
Summer Olympics, the ruling military regime intended to use this opportunity to meet 
three objectives. First, the military regime sought to legitimize its rule by using the 
Olympics as a conduit to gain favorability among the rising middle class. South Korea 
had shifted from an agrarian to an industrial economy, and most of the middle class was 
leaving the countryside and creating a large workforce in urban environments. This in 
turn raised the standard of living among South Koreans, and the GNP was steadily 
increasing.56 This resulted in economic freedom without political freedom, and the 
middle class was growing increasingly anxious to have a say in the political future of 
their country.  
Second, General Chung wanted to raise international recognition of South 
Korea’s economic emergence. In 1971, South Korea had to abandon plans to host the 
Asian Games as it could not afford to build the necessary facilities, which it considered a 
national and international embarrassment.57 Therefore, the regime sought to burnish its 
international image by successfully hosting the Olympics: “In this context, the visibility 
afforded by a successful Olympic enterprise would proclaim to the world South Korea's 
new status as an industrializing country while providing a vehicle for credit-claiming at 
home.”58 The regime’s desire to project a positive national image abroad became 
increasingly significant as the Olympic Games drew near as the regime attempted to deal 
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with increasing unrest and accusations of human rights abuses. While news outlets 
around the world did not give much space to the complete disrespect for social rights in 
South Korea, there were a few reporters discussing the topic in the Wall Street Journal 
and the New York Times.59 
Lastly, the government sought to renew awareness of the threat posed by North 
Korea.60 Days after winning the right to host, North Korea demanded the right to cohost 
eight events and called the event “the Games of the XXIVth Olympiad at Pyongyang.”61 
The run up to the games became an endless back-and-forth between North and South 
Korea with threats, and acts of terrorism, most notably the bombing of South Korean 
Airlines flight 858 in 1987 by North Korean agents killing everyone on board.62 By 
having the Olympics in South Korea, all participating nations would arrive and feel the 
effects of North Korean intimidation and aggression. It would also require substantial 
diplomatic work by the North Koreans to convince other nations to boycott a second 
Olympics after all communist nations had boycotted the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles. 
North Korea’s efforts proved futile with 160 nations participating in the South Korean 
Games. South Korea also did not share any of its hosting duties with its neighbor to the 
north. In protest, North Korea decided not to participate. South Korea did successfully 
restore awareness of the North’s aggression and even recruited a few of North Korea’s 
allies, notably China and the USSR, into trade agreements.63  
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In analyzing the normative growth in South Korea from the early to late 1980s, 
what began as an extremely repressive regime turned into a regime that saw no other way 
to survive than to concede to certain public demands. Concerning the norms of political 
inclusion and respect for civil liberties, General Chung used military force to repress 
dissent against his own people (i.e. the Kwangju Massacre in 1980). This was a clear 
violation of civil rights, namely the freedom of speech and the right to peaceful protests. 
Also, the electoral system was clearly not inclusive and demonstrated no adherence to 
inclusion of other political parties. News censorship was a direct violation of basic 
freedoms afforded in a democratic society. However, as the Olympic Games approached, 
with increasing international scrutiny as athletes, press, and political members from all 
over the world arrived, the South Korean government made substantial concessions to 
retain the right to host and to diffuse the political crisis. “Rather than a pressure-point for 
sustaining the political status quo to maintain stability, [the Olympics] became a 
pressure-point forcing controlled change to maintain stability.”64 
The military regime in South Korea was heavily invested in the successful hosting 
of the Olympics, and the pressure mounted by this was a catalyst that proved too much. 
Chung and his supporters knew that hosting the Olympics would make South Korea 
highly visible; however, they did not realize that hosting would actually bring about the 
democratization of their own regime. As a result of hosting the Olympics and the 
international scrutiny it brought upon itself, the domestic struggles for political change in 
Korea were highlighted and this “helped extract concessions from a government on its 
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best behavior.”65 So with mounting international pressure, General Chung changed the 
constitution to allow for direct presidential elections in 1986.66 However, this was not 
enough to discourage Koreans from demanding more democratic changes, and protests 
continued into 1987.  
Student unrest, coupled with international pressures, ultimately removed General 
Chung from power in 1987 and brought General Roh Tae-woo into office.67 The 
continuing political instability worried the IOC and those due to take part in the Olympics 
the following year. To save the country’s reputation and not lose the right to host, 
General Roh granted more political liberalization and pursued an anti-corruption agenda.   
Even though General Roh was part of the old military regime, his June 29th Declaration 
paved the way for the first free parliamentary elections in 1988.68 This brought in a new, 
freely elected parliament that was in favor of more democratic reforms, even though 
some members were part of the former military regime. 
Observing the FHI scores in the case of South Korea, the scores clearly indicate 
advancement and lasting change took place, even before the event occurred. Table 4.1 
indicates a dramatic change in South Korea between the years it won the right to host and 
the year it hosted. Initially it was classified as not free in both Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties with a score of five in 1981. Dramatic changes within South Korea occurred by 
the time the Olympics began. South Korea’s Political Rights improved to two in 1988, 
indicating a classification of free. That score remained the same five years later, 
indicating a lasting change. Similarly, South Korea’s Civil Liberties score improved to a 
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three the year it hosted indicating partially free, and improved further to two five years 
after hosting. These scores point to lasting changes in South Korea.  
 The South Korean political transition from an authoritarian military regime to an 
electoral democracy is the best example of the influence that mega-sporting events can 
have on illiberal states, forcing them to liberalize. Ultimately, “It was the presence of the 
press, the negative image of South Korea it conveyed to the world, and the legitimacy it 
conferred on demonstrators and opposition politicians that ultimately forced the ruling 
party to make significant political concessions.”69 The preparations for the 1988 Olympic 
Games became the necessary political context to enable reform of South Korea’s military 
dictatorship, giving voice and the right to vote to the protestors who previously had been 
silenced and only shown the barrel of a gun. The democratic reforms continued and in 
1993 the election of the first civilian president and opponent of the military regime, Kim 
Young Sam, took place.70  
China: 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics 
 The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics were both record-breaking and startling for 
many reasons. First, 204 nations were represented, the most in the history of any 
Olympics at the time. Second, it became the most-watched Olympics ever, and possibly 
the most-watched event in history, with approximately 70 percent of the world’s 
population tuning in to observe the festivities. Estimates put that number at around 4.7 
billion viewers from every corner of the globe.71 It was also the first Olympics to have 
global digital coverage, offering 153 million viewers the opportunity to watch via live 
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broadcasts online in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Third, 100 international 
dignitaries, including 85 heads of state, attended the opening ceremony. This included the 
U.S. President, which marked the first time a U.S. President attended an opening 
ceremony not on American soil. Lastly, it was the most expensive Olympics at that time, 
totaling around US$40 billion in preparation costs: more than all the Summer Games 
since 1984 combined.72 Beijing 2008 truly was a global event.  
However, staging the most expensive Olympics came at a cost to many Chinese 
citizens. International observers, including Amnesty International, recorded multiple 
human rights violations as a result of the Games. It is estimated that the preparations for 
the Beijing Olympic Games displaced 1.5 million people in Beijing alone. This was 
caused by massive evictions by the Beijing municipal government in low-income 
neighborhoods for the construction of stadiums/venues and villages that were used during 
the Games. “Due to the large-scale urban gentrification and stadium construction, the 
government, in order to establish these centrally planned zones, coerced residents out of 
their homes with little or no compensation or re-accommodation plans.”73 This had a 
larger impact on the lower socioeconomic class and was an adverse aspect of the 
Olympic legacy the Chinese communist government was trying to create.  
The People’s Republic of China grew out of the Mao Revolution that took place 
in 1949. The communist party, led by Mao Zedong, fought a 20-year civil war against the 
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nationalist party that ended with the nationalists retreating to present day Taiwan.74 Mao 
oversaw the Cultural Revolution that took place from 1966-76, which produced intense 
social, political, and economic upheaval. Mao ruled until his death in 1976, at which time 
Deng Xiaoping emerged as leader of the communist party. Many of Mao’s practices and 
policies are still in place in some form today. Mao’s illiberal regime used a firm, and 
often violent, hand to deal with dissidence or attempts to undermine the ruling regime. 
Deng Xiaoping undertook far-reaching economic reforms, normalized relations 
with the United States, instituted the One-Child Policy to curb population growth, and 
continued the suppression of many minority groups.75 Also, Deng instituted the Open-
Door Policy for foreign investments and developed the private sector, which catapulted 
the Chinese economy to becoming the 3rd largest economy in the world by 1992 and the 
2nd largest by 2010, as reported by the IMF.76 However, during Deng’s rule, the historic 
Tiananmen Square protests took place that saw pro-democratic student protests and 
uprisings against the Chinese military.77 Ultimately, the Chinese military suppressed the 
protests using lethal force. This shed light on, and resulted in, the worldwide 
condemnation of the human rights abuses taking place in China.  
The next president, Jiang Zemin, took charge in 1989 as leader of the People’s 
Republic of China. The communist party noticed Jiang during his time as mayor of 
Shanghai, in which he effectively dealt with student and professor protests while still 
maintaining control of the city. During his time as president, a meeting between the 
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Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in 1996 agreed to 
cooperate to combat ethnic and religious tensions in each other’s countries.78 Jiang also 
cracked down on political dissent by banning the China Democratic Party in 1998. In 
contrast, he worked to help private entrepreneurs and incorporate them into the 
communist party. It was under Jiang’s leadership that China bid to host the Olympics, 
wining the right to host in 2001. The IOC was concerned about the prospective host two 
years later when the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak occurred in 
China. However, officials felt China had enough time to address the outbreak and ensure 
safety for the Games in 2008. It was also in 2001 that Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai 
Five, creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and an agreement was signed to 
fight ethnic and religious militants in their respective countries while increasing trade and 
investment.79 
Jiang Zemin was replaced in 2003 when the communist party members elected 
Hu Jintao as President. Hu was the leader of the party when Beijing hosted the 2008 
Olympics, and he sought to develop more economic ties with Asian and African nations. 
Jiang continued the regime’s previous practices of centralized authority and the 
repression of political dissidence. Growing international awareness of the human rights 
abuses in China began to create increasing calls for greater accountability by the Chinese 
government for the atrocities it was committing against its own people. From 2003-2008, 
Amnesty International published eight reports regarding the Chinese government’s 
disrespect for social, human, worker, and immigrant rights leading up to the Olympics 
entitled the “Olympics Countdown.” However, such reports were never released in China 






because the phrase “human rights” is censored in China. 80  Media censorship is one 
method the Chinese government has used to keep its population, consisting of 20 percent 
of the world population, uninformed about global norms related to respect for individual 
rights. 
The literature about the 2008 Beijing Olympics, emphasizes that the Chinese 
government’s motivation for hosting were the political importance and international-
image building that occur for host nations: “The Beijing Olympics is first and foremost a 
political act and assertion. It is also a statement of national intent, the culmination of 
ideological effort going back to 1999 and the outcome of political, social, cultural and 
economic changes.”81 In sum, China hoped to use global sporting as an avenue to achieve 
respect, esteem, and international recognition.  
China experienced vast economic growth in the 1990s and had been categorized 
by many economists and other scholars as an emerging global power.82 The 
government’s bid to host sought to rectify the prevailing image of China as a poor, 
developing country that many around the world still pictured. However, a large portion of 
the country still lives below the poverty line, and acts of political dissent result in 
apprehension and imprisonment of many activists. China wanted to utilize the Olympics 
to reinvent its image abroad by displaying a technologically advanced, modern, and 
unified image to the observers watching around the world. Also, some IOC members 
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hoped that by awarding the Games to China, the international pressure and scrutiny 
brought on the government would prompt liberalization.83 
Beijing lost the bid to host the 2000 Olympics to Sydney. Many IOC members 
indicated that China was not ready for such an event, largely due to its human rights 
record.84 There was also concern over the amount of smog and pollution in Beijing, 
ranked one of the world’s worst cities for air pollution.85 The Beijing Olympics theme of 
“One World, One Dream” was an attempt by the Beijing Organizing Committee for the 
Olympic Games (BOCOG) to secure its bid predicated on the agreement that all 
attendees, most notably journalists, would be accorded unfettered access throughout the 
country and would be able to report on any topic they wanted. The IOC saw this 
provision of the bid – which addressed the IOC’s concern with the bid on the 2000 
Games – as a concession by the Chinese government regarding certain stipulations that 
would restrict journalists and the reporting of human rights within China.86 China also 
committed to host the most environmentally friendly Olympics ever, terming it the 
“Green Olympics.” China sought to counter its renowned negative environmental record 
by using the most sustainable and eco-friendly materials for construction.87 Both – the 
freedom for the media and commitment to green construction – were unparalleled moves 
by the Chinese government.  
One serious point of contention on the issue of human rights was the exclusion 
and mistreatment of Tibetans. The Tibet issue was widely discussed among critics of the 
                                                 
83
 Stefanie Beyer, “The Green Olympic Movement: Beijing 2008,” Chinese Journal of 
International Law 5, no. 2 (July 1, 2006): 423–40. 
84
 David Rowe, “The Bid, the Lead-Up, the Event and the Legacy: Global Cultural Politics and 
Hosting the Olympics,” British Journal of Sociology 63, no. 2 (June 2012): 285–305. 
85







protests along many stops of the Olympic Torch Relay in advance of the Beijing opening 
ceremony. Also, with China’s close economic ties and political support to the Sudanese 
government, which has pursued policies of genocidal activities in Darfur, some 
journalists and activists termed the Beijing Games the “Genocide Games” or “Genocide 
Olympics” in an attempt to discredit the Chinese government during its global coming 
out party.88  
As previously noted, the Beijing Olympics were the most expensive in history at 
that time. (The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia now hold the record.) In 
preparation, the Chinese government built large, lavish facilities and venues for the 
Games. As part of this new construction, the Chinese government confiscated and bought 
land in urban environments. Most of the land was acquired well below market value, and 
millions of people were forced out of their homes with little to no compensation: 
“China’s paradoxical status as a market economy led by an authoritarian state thus 
facilitated the demolition of entire city neighborhoods and mass eviction of residents for 
the Olympics.”89 Many citizens tried to fight their evictions and stay in their homes; 
however, developers employed eviction squads that forced citizens out of their homes in 
the middle of the night, with citizens watching their home being destroyed with their 
possessions still inside.   
In regards to political inclusion and respect for civil rights, China has shown a 
clear disregard for all these in the exclusion and mistreatment of Tibetans; strict and 
violent government responses to certain ethnic; religious, and political groups; censorship 
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of the media; and a strict One-Child policy that resulted in female infanticide practices 
for decades.90 These are but a few examples of the practices that are out of alignment 
with global norms. Some human rights activists even claim that China’s human rights 
record has actually become worse since hosting, noting that the Olympics “contributed to 
the country's anti-democratic environment, as the leadership forcibly moved millions of 
people to make way for Olympic facilities and placed new restrictions on ethnic and 
religious minorities.”91  
However, as a result, certain policies implemented by the Chinese government 
have curtailed some abuses, paving the way for a bit more freedom. Most notable are the 
free press policies that were instituted for the Olympics and the resulting impact on 
China’s domestic media. Separate from the social, educational, environmental, and 
infrastructural legacies from the Beijing 2008, the IOC noted in its Final Report of the 
Games of the XXIX Olympiad, Beijing 2008 that the extension of international media 
access rights for the Games “ended up being one of the great legacies of the Beijing 
Games, with unparalleled access rights guaranteed to the world media and maintained 
long after . . . some of these positive developments appear to have attained 
permanence.”92 This report also noted that several laws enacted for the Games remain in 
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place regarding: anti-piracy measures; IP rights; and the Internet.93 The enactment of 
these laws demonstrates that in preparation for an event of a global scale, and the fact that 
this was the first Olympics to have global digital coverage, Internet related issues and 
media restrictions had to be changed. While a few of the Internet related laws have since 
been retracted (due to a fear of the role the Internet played in the Arab Spring democracy 
movement), many of them are still in place today. 
Another positive outcome from the Beijing 2008 Olympics is the environmental 
awareness and sustainability education that occurred among Chinese citizens. Beijing 
promised a green, high-tech and people focused Games, and part of that came true. With 
new policies being implemented and a large amount of funding earmarked for sustainable 
construction of the venues, this was a dramatic step forward in terms of China’s 
environmental policies. “Of the estimated $25 billion devoted to the Olympic 
preparations, nearly half has been designated for environmental improvement projects. A 
total of $12.2 billion is earmarked … [for] projects that range from changing energy 
policies, retrofitting high-polluting enterprises, and moving factories to improving 
infrastructure, reducing auto emissions and solid waste control.”94  
One such policy was the Environmental Impact Assessment Law (EIA) that 
requires all large construction projects to perform environmental and social impact 
assessments prior to beginning construction. This law, created in 2002 and revised in 
2006 and 2012, requires companies to include public participation on all projects:  
To enhance public participation in the EIA process, SEPA [State 
Environmental Protection Agency] promulgated the Provisional 
Measures on Public Participation in Environmental Impact 
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Assessment (Provisional Measures), aiming to promote process 
transparency and ensure public access to information by 
imposing an obligation to disclose information on project 





It seems that such laws and provisions are slowly beginning to make an impact, as SEPA 
has shut down many construction projects for companies that have failed to produce such 
impact assessments.96 
The amount of money spent on the Olympics also had some benefits for the city 
of Beijing, “such as the encouragement of grassroots sports, the shaping of a national 
identity, the growth in environmental awareness, and increased sports participation 
among the young.”97 However, it seems that outside of Beijing, socially excluded groups 
did not feel the benefit of the Olympics. A survey conducted by Lynn Minnaert found 
that hosting the Olympics might have actually increased social inequalities as opposed to 
reducing them. She notes that the lavish spending in Beijing actually made socially 
excluded groups feel worse off by the overt spending displayed by the privileged. 
However, she notes that, “social exclusion is not an often-used concept in China – it may 
not be culturally relevant.”98 That said, while the Games did not produce a tangible 
benefit to some socially excluded groups, it did increase awareness of inequalities, which 
could position these groups to further political mobilization in the future. 
Observing the FHI scores in the case of China, the numbers indicate neutral 
growth within five years of hosting. Table 4.1 shows no growth in China’s Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties scores for the years China was awarded the games, the year it 
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hosted, or five years after. Within the span of 12 years, no growth in either category took 
place. These scores indicate that China remains ranked as one of the most un-free nations 
in the world.  
In sum, while the 2008 Beijing Olympics facilitated advancement in some 
elements of Internet and media freedom, the development of Beijing citizens’ awareness 
of environmental and health issues, and an inclusiveness among Beijing residents, it 
failed to expand some of these changes to all parts of China. And, while it may have 
increased awareness among socially excluded groups, it failed to result in meaningful 
advancements in the government’s respect for social rights. While some of the IOC’s 
hopes to use the Games as a catalyst for the liberalization of human rights fell short, the 
Games resulted in greater international scrutiny in and of China. The 2008 Beijing Games 
shows that the ideals of olympism, as translated into action by the hosting of the 
Olympics, have a definite but uneven impact on the advancement of global social norms 
and liberalization. 
Analysis 
Has there been some liberalization in the host countries I have selected, that one 
can claim to be the result of the decision to host? Overall, to some degree yes but not 
necessarily with lasting effect.  
In most countries, hosting has led to a free media (at least for the event) and 
inclusion of previously socially excluded groups into sporting activity. In addition, these 
events serve as a galvanizing force for international pressure, media scrutiny, and 
domestic activism/mobilization. Because the governing bodies and the events themselves 
embody the liberal ideals of inclusiveness and social rights, there is the expectation that 
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the host countries will uphold and respect these values.  With that expectation comes 
pressure to conform to and uphold those ideals, which results in liberalization. 
International pressure focuses on any negative practices conducted by the host 
nation; this could be in the area of human rights abuses, suppression of individuals or 
groups, corruption within the government, and a lack of general respect for citizens’ 
rights. Examples of this are the large movement to boycott the Argentina World Cup due 
to its practice of “disappearing” opponents and the pressure applied by the international 
community on the South Korean regime for change prior to the Olympics.  
Media scrutiny highlights the failures or troubles of the ruling regime. This media 
scrutiny mainly comes from the international press evaluating the hosting country. 
Examples of this include the reports produced by AI before the Beijing Olympics that 
highlighted the failures of the communist party on the Tibetan issue, and the role the 
press played in highlighting Chinese support for the Sudanese government.  
Domestic actors mobilize against an illiberal regime during the lead up to, and 
actual hosting of, the event. This mobilization is amplified by the presence of the 
international press, which results in the development of an international network 
supporting the activists’ agenda. An example is the increase in human rights based NGOs 
in Mexico due to attention received by the international press.  
These three influences are interlocking. Individually, these factors may produce 
nominal adherence to political inclusion and the respect of civil liberties. However, these 
three factors combined have a larger and more instrumental effect on the liberalization 
process; global sporting events serve as a force-multiplier galvanizing these three factors. 
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As such, when these three factors work in concert, a country is more like to experience 
political liberalization. 
In South Korea, all three factors were present (international pressure, media 
attention, and domestic mobilization), which led to substantial liberalization and 
ultimately to democratization: international pressure by the IOC and the countries 
attending the event highlighted the political exclusion of certain groups; media scrutiny 
regarding the regime’s ability to prepare for the event showcased the nervousness 
surrounding the importance of the event for the regime; and a renewed domestic 
activism/mobilization took place in the years leading up to the event via pro-democratic 
student, labor, and religious protests. This was the only case in which all three factors 
were present, and it is also the case that experienced the largest change in political 
inclusion and respect for civil liberties.  
Argentina also experienced more than one influence (international pressure, 
media attention), and while hosting may not have led directly to liberalization, increased 
international pressure as a result of media attention led to more domestic mobilization 
post-event. The international pressure placed on Argentina by the qualifying nations 
through a boycott campaign almost led to the cancellation of the 1978 World Cup. 
Similarly, the report by AI that highlighted the abuses taking place resulted in an increase 
in the international press in attendance, giving this World Cup the nickname of “The 
World Cup of the Press.” This in turn had a substantial effect on the democratization of 
Argentina in the early 1980s.  
In both Mexico and China only one factor was present. As a result of Mexico’s 
hosting, domestic mobilization took place in the form of a growth in NGOs within 
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Mexico. The absence of international pressure and media attention to its human rights 
practices effectively held the PRI in place, and as such a slower process of 
democratization occurred. While there was a small advance in political inclusion that 
began just after hosting, the wider reform largely occurred later as a result of problems 
within the PRI and its handling of the Mexican financial crisis, not the hosting of the 
World Cup.  
China saw the least amount of liberalization overall, as shown in the case study 
and by its Freedom House Index scores. China essentially only experienced increased 
media attention regarding its suppression of the Internet and press, which in turn led to a 
limited loosening up in these areas. International scrutiny over China’s human rights 
policies began long before China hosted the Olympics; therefore, this was not a new 
factor attributed to hosting.  
It seems that in both Mexico and China, several mitigating factors were present 
that reduced lasting liberalization. In Mexico, the significantly short prep time – three 
years versus twelve years – may have hindered the full development of international 
scrutiny and media attention. This in turn did not result in sustained pressure for many 
years prior to hosting, which was not enough time to allow international pressure to gain 
momentum. This may also have been in part because Mexico’s international human 
rights policies were so different from its domestic ones; observers may have overlooked 
such domestic policies.  
In China, no lasting liberalization took place during the event because the 
communist party held a stronghold on power in China. The ruling party had essentially 
no competition politically and had a tight grip on those in charge of the Olympics. The 
 78 
regime sought to internalize Olympic success into Chinese success, making those who 
were against hosting or were impeding positive developments seem like disloyal persons. 
Therefore, the communist party’s power overshadowed attempts by citizens to have the 
regime seen in a negative light. 
Moreover, global events outside the realm of sport, can lead to the retraction of 
reforms initiated during hosting. In China, for example, the limited Internet and media 
reforms that took place during the Olympics were retracted in response to the Arab 
Spring democracy movement that began in 2010. The Arab Spring resulted in protective 
measures being taken by some illiberal, authoritarian regimes in order to maintain the 
status quo: “The Chinese Communist Party’s pushback, which aimed to quash potential 
prodemocracy demonstrations before they even emerged, reached a crescendo in 
December [2012] with the sentencing of a number of dissident writers to long terms in 
prison.”99 
Hosting the Olympics seems to have a larger impact on liberalization than hosting 
the World Cup. Since the IOC is involved in a plethora of sports, and it is hosted every 
two years via the Summer and Winter Olympics, it seems there is a larger impact on host 
nations. The Olympics also have a greater association with human rights. Scholars have 
noted the effect that hosting the Olympics can have on host nations. According to Black 
and Bezanson, “…in the post-Cold War era, there is a sound basis for believing that the 
Olympics will be positively associated with human rights amelioration and/or 
democratization.”100 Manheim adds that, “In this context, it might be useful to view the 
hosting of the Olympics as a event highly dramatic, highly visible, quasi-historical, 
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intermediate-length which possesses a sufficient dynamic of its own, under certain 
circumstances, to overwhelm those who would use or control it.”101  
A study in 2010 found that protests held in connection with the Olympics from 
1896 until 2008 have “grown substantially over time and evolved from a tendency toward 
state-based boycotts and domestic demonstration to a tendency toward protest over an 
increasingly broad range of issues [such as human rights, poverty, environment] by 
transnational networks and social movements.”102  
With both IOC and FIFA events attracting such attention and viewership, it is 
easy to see why these organizations have been utilizing sport as a catalyst for change in 
host countries. According to news reports, “The 2010 World Cup final was probably seen 
by at least 1 billion people, though the 2008 Beijing Olympics opening ceremony appears 
to retain top spot as the most-watched televised event.”103 This shows how important 
sport is to the everyday citizen, and if FIFA and the IOC use hosting as a platform to 
promote the democratic values within their charters, hosting could have far reaching 
implications in the future as citizens expect certain conditions to change in accordance 
with the values promoted.  
Conclusion  
 The case studies show that there can be an incidental liberalization of illiberal 
host nations when they host global sporting events. However, liberalization does not 
always take place and is determined by a multitude of factors. Under the right 
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circumstances, a nation can undergo significant liberalization if international pressure, 
media attention, and domestic mobilization occur. These factors mutually reinforce one 
another. On the other hand, preparation time, and the strength of the ruling regime are 
factors that work against liberalization. 
FIFA has less of a political approach than the IOC, and therefore less of an 
impact, on furthering the democracy agenda. Jerome Valcke, FIFA Secretary General, 
stated in 2013 at a Symposium discussing the World Cup as an event, “I will say 
something which is crazy, but less democracy is sometimes better for organising a World 
Cup.”104 He continued, “When you have a very strong head of state who can decide, as 
maybe [President Vladimir] Putin can do in 2018, that is easier for us organisers than a 
country such as Germany, where you have to negotiate at different levels.”105 FIFA’s 
goal is to produce a profitable and memorable World Cup, it is not to advocate for 
liberalization. Nevertheless, my research and the work of scholars has shown that 
political change can be a byproduct of hosting the Olympics and World Cup simply 
because it accords with the norms of sport.  
 Future works could focus more on the conditions imposed by FIFA and the IOC 
on host nations. Currently, many of the required documents are confidential or only 
available at the headquarters of both organizations, both of which are located in 
Switzerland. As these reports become declassified, more information on the 
conditionality placed on host nations will become available, allowing scholars to assess 
what other factors led to, or could lead to, political – and social – liberalization in host 
nations.  
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